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Abstract
This dissertation analyzes three aspects of the economics of water pollution and is orga-
nized in three essays. The first essay examines permit trading in water pollution where
pollution is different in the persistence of environmental damage. The second essay ex-
amines the problem of reliably meeting a water quality standard under environmental
uncertainty. The third essay considers the problem of reliably meeting a water quality
standard under asymmetric information.
The first essay analyzes how to properly design water pollution permit trading with
pollutants which are non-uniformly mixed across space and have different persistence
in environmental damages. The efficient solution to water pollution abatement involves
integrating the difference in the environmental persistence caused by pollutants and
setting trading ratios in permit trading accordingly.
The second essay analyzes the problem of meeting a water quality standard with
a certain degree of reliability given environmental stochasticity, where the distribution
of environmental stochasticity is unknown. The essay develops the use of a reliability
target that caps the probability of not attaining the target in any period at α, where
1− α is the level of reliability. A single-tailed version of Chebyshev’s inequality is used
that measures the maximum probability of being in the right tail of the probability
distribution. The essay also examines a margin of safety in Total Maximum Daily
Loads (TMDL) and concludes that if a given level of reliability is desirable, the margin
of safety should vary with the level of TMDL.
The third essay considers the problem of reliably achieving a water quality standard
where water pollution is generated by multiple sources and there is asymmetric infor-
mation. Asymmetric information comes from privately observable actions like fertilizer
application and private information on profits. This essay develops a Vickery-Clark-
Groves (VCG) subsidy auction and incorporates a fine/reward scheme based on whether
the water quality standard is met. This subsidy auction can achieve an efficient solution
to the problem of achieving a reliability standard under asymmetric information.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Water quality is an important dimension of water security. The deterioration of wa-
ter quality directly affects human well-being: it threatens public health, degrades the
recreational use of water bodies, and disturbs the provision of ecosystem services. For
example, excessive mercury, arsenic, and nitrogen in drinking water damage human’s
kidney and liver, and affect oxygen transport in the bloodstream. Eutrophication caused
by excessive nutrients makes water bodies unsuitable for fishing or swimming, and im-
pairs nearby property values. Water-related ecosystem services, such as the capacity
of assimilation, purification, and storage, may be undermined by water pollution, and
people become more vulnerable to natural disasters.
The current state of water quality is not satisfactory. The United Nation reports
that more than 80% of wastewater worldwide is discharged directly into surface wa-
ters without being collected or treated. In the European Union, agricultural pollution
threatens 38% of water bodies (WWAP, 2015). In the United States, 49% of coastal and
Great Lakes nearshore waters are rated poor in ecological fish tissue quality (USEPA,
2015). Nutrient pollution is widespread in lakes and rivers: 40% of lakes and 46%
of rivers/streams are found with excessive total phosphorus, 35% of lakes and 41% of
rivers/streams are found with excessive total nitrogen (USEPA, 2016a; USEPA, 2016b).
Considering a growing population, increasing urbanization, and economic develop-
ment, the pressure on water quality may go up in coming decades. In order to serve the
growing needs of populations and economies by 2050, food production should be dou-
bled in developing countries, and 60% more food should be produced globally. We may
1
2see a trend of intensive and industrialized agriculture with improved crop productivity.
However, more chemicals and fertilizers may be applied and end up in water bodies.
Agricultural water pollution is likely to worsen.
The past decades have witnessed progress in protecting water quality. In the United
States, the Environmental Protection Agency was established in 1970 to conserve the
environment. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, popularly known as the Clean
Water Act, was passed in 1972 and is one of the most influential environmental laws.
Moreover, there are continuing scientific studies on water pollution, in terms of its
formation and causes, its consequences on human health and the environment, and
related conservation practices or treatment techniques. Economists have studied non-
market valuation of the deterioration of water quality, the optimal pollution control,
and the development of policy instruments.
Despite the progress in protecting water quality, the incremental cost of controlling
water pollution began to exceed the incremental benefit in the United States since
around 1990 (Olmstead, 2009). One reason is increasing abatement cost due to inefficient
environmental policies, such as technology-based uniform eﬄuent standards (Shortle
and Horan, 2013). The other reason is serious agricultural runoff which has not been
regulated by the Clean Water Act. The lawsuit between the Des Moines Water Works
(DMWW) and three Iowa drainage districts exemplifies a conflict between agriculture
and water quality, where DMWW sued the districts for the excessive nitrates from
the farmland into the Raccoon River, i.e. the source of drinking water for the Des
Moines metro area. Controlling water pollution requires attentions, because the features
of water pollution control should be properly considered in developing environmental
policies and regulation.
The first feature of water pollution control is that water pollutants are non-uniformly
mixed across space. The marginal environmental damage of water pollution differs with
emission locations (Fisher-Vanden and Olmstead, 2013). Chapter 2 solves this non-
uniform mixing problem of water pollution in permit trading, when there is a difference
in persistence of environmental damage. Two types of pollution are discussed, with
different persistence characteristics. One is flow pollution, which causes immediate
but ephemeral environmental damage. The other is stock pollution, which generates
persistent environmental damage. In solving the non-uniform mixing problem of water
3pollution, very few studies on permit trading have considered this difference between
flow pollution and stock pollution. Ignoring this difference makes the first-best outcome
of pollution control unattainable through permit trading. This chapter contributes to
develop proper trading ratios in permit trading, which account for the dynamic process
of stock pollution. They can induce the first-best outcome of pollution control.
The second feature of water pollution control is that the result of water pollution
control is affected by environmental stochasticity. Given conservation management,
water pollution may still be high in some years due to weather conditions like precip-
itation. Chapter 3 focuses on pollution control under environmental uncertainty, and
emphasizes the importance of reliably meeting a water quality standard. This chap-
ter proposes the use of a reliability target that caps the probability of not attaining
the target in any period at α, where 1 − α is the level of reliability. A single-tailed
version of Chebyshev’s inequality is used, which emphasizes preventing heavy pollution
in the right tail of pollution probability when the probability distribution is unknown.
The empirical results, using data from the Wolf Creek Watershed in Iowa, show that a
reliability target results in larger losses of agricultural profits than an average target,
but meets a specified water quality standard with a higher frequency. For example, a
75% loss in agricultural profit ($59.8 million) is incurred to achieve a 41% reduction in
total nitrogen relative to the baseline pollution level with a 70% reliability, but this 41%
reduction in total nitrogen is met in nine years during 2004-2013. It contrasts with the
scenario of an average target, where this 40% reduction is only attained in five years
during 2004-2013. The reliability target can be a valuable tool when it is important
to meet a pollution reduction consistently. It should be properly considered in current
water quality management.
The third feature of water pollution control is that asymmetric information widely
exists to prevent deriving efficient pollution control. Abatement cost is private informa-
tion, abatement practices are not observable, and individual pollution is too costly to
detect. Chapter 4 looks at agricultural pollution control under asymmetric information.
This chapter’s contribution is to design a Vickery-Clark-Groves (VCG) subsidy auction
and incorporate an ambient fine/reward scheme into the auction, so as to achieve re-
liability of pollution control under asymmetric information. This auction mechanism
4makes truthful revelation a dominant strategy. The fine/reward scheme prevents devi-
ation from subsidized pollution abatement practices when they are unobservable.
Chapter 2
Water Quality Trading with Flow
Pollution and Stock Pollution
2.1 Introduction
The success of permit trading in air pollution inspires people to extend its application
in water pollution. Compared with air pollution, Fisher-Vanden and Olmstead (2013)
summarize five challenges in forming a successful permit trading in water pollution. The
first and foremost challenge is that compared with permit trading in air pollution, water
pollutants are not uniformly mixed. Unlike air pollution, the marginal environmental
damage of water pollution may differ to a large degree with the emission location (Fisher-
Vanden and Olmstead, 2013). Considering the characteristics of receiving waters, we
categorize water pollution into river pollution and lake pollution, or more generally, into
flow pollution and stock pollution.
The difference between flow pollution and stock pollution is not just about the loca-
tion of receiving waters, but more importantly, it is about the damage persistence. Flow
pollution causes immediate damage but such damage does not persist in the environ-
ment, while stock pollution causes persisting damage in the environment. Depending
on the decay rates and the characteristics of receiving waters, pollutants like chemicals,
organisms and nutrients can generate both flow pollution and stock pollution. For ex-
ample, chemicals and sediments deteriorate water quality both in the Grand River and
in downstream Lake Michigan (Schrauben, 2010), and nutrients cause eutrophication
5
6problem in both the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico. In most cases, river
pollution is regarded as flow pollution, since pollutants are easily taken away by water
flows, and their influence on a specific location along a river is temporary (Lieb, 2004).1
Lake pollution, on the other hand, can be properly considered as stock pollution, as
pollutants may accumulate over time in a lake.
Back to the non-uniform mixing problem of water pollution in permit trading,
location-related trading ratios have been developed, in the spirit of exchange rates,
to account for the diverse impact of emissions from different locations. Actually, Mont-
gomery (1972) in the seminal paper on market for pollution control discusses a trading-
ratio system in permit trading. More recently, Farrow et al. (2005) develop another
efficient trading-ratio system based on environmental damage of emissions from dif-
ferent places. Their trading-ratio system solves the non-uniform mixing problem of
water pollution in an innovative way. More comprehensive factors such as heterogenous
demographic conditions and economic development in distinct areas are considered in
damage-based trading ratios, compared with eﬄuent-based trading ratios more closely
related to Montgomery’s.
Although trading ratios are introduced for trade in non-uniformly mixed pollutants,
the design of trading ratios has not completely considered the difference in persistence
of environmental damage caused by pollutants. Many studies on water quality trading
(WQT) only focus on river pollution, which is a form of flow pollution (e.g. Montgomery,
1972; Farrow et al., 2005; Hung and Shaw, 2005; Mesbah et al., 2009). Although
there are some studies discussing some current permit trading programs which tend to
alleviate deterioration in lakes and reservoirs, they look at physical eﬄuents and do
not take the dynamics of stock pollution damage into account (e.g. Stephenson et al.,
1998; Obropta and Rusciano, 2006; Roberts and Clark, 2008). The coexistence of flow
pollution and stock pollution has been, in general, either ignored, or treated as the same
type of pollution in WQT.
Flow pollution and stock pollution require different models in analysis, as pointed out
by Hoel and Karp (2001). Flow pollution fits a static model, while stock pollution needs
1 We admit that not all pollutants are easily carried away by water flows. For example, phosphorus
can be incorporated with sediments, which are insoluble and accumulating in rivers. In this sense, it is
more like stock pollution than flow pollution. In the rest of paper, we focus on soluble pollutants which
can be easily brought away to the downstream by water flows.
7a dynamic model as pollutants accumulated in the past affect the current environmental
damage. To our knowledge, these does not appear to be any research on WQT that
considers persistent environmental damage of stock pollution. In designing trading
ratios to solve the non-uniform mixing problem of water pollution, considering this
difference between flow pollution and stock pollution is important in designing efficient
WQT policies. Considering pollution control over stock pollution, there are numerous
studies developing dynamic models and deriving the optimal solution and the steady
state, whereas they have not analyzed whether it is possible to realize the cost-effective
outcome via WQT (e.g. Dechert and O’Donnell, 2006; Iwasa et al., 2007; Laukkanen
and Huhtala, 2008; Hediger, 2009).2
This paper contributes to solve the non-uniform mixing problem of water pollution,
when there is heterogeneity in persistence of environmental damage. We develop a set of
damage-based trading ratios in a scenario where both flow pollution and stock pollution
are considered. In this paper, we point out that to solve the non-uniform mixing prob-
lem and attain the first-best result of pollution control, a set of trading ratios should
consider marginal river damage, marginal lake damage, and the heterogeneity of persis-
tence of environmental damage caused by polluters. In the simulation, we compare the
equilibrium permit prices in the scenarios where persistence of environmental damage
is considered or not. The efficiency loss could be high if we ignore the heterogeneity in
persistence of environmental damage for pollution control.
The paper is organized in the following order. Section 2 establishes a cost-effective
approach to pollution control from the perspective of the regulator. Section 3 analyzes
the equilibrium of permit trading and develops damage-based trading ratios under the
coexistence of flow pollution and stock pollution. Section 4 runs a simulation and
compares the results of permit trading when the difference between flow pollution and
stock pollution is considered and not. Section 5 concludes.
2 In fact, the literature on WQT does not lack dynamic optimization analysis. There is an increasing
number of studies on dynamic permit trading since 1996, where the dynamic process occurs as a result
of permit banking becoming possible in tradable permit programs (Hasegawa and Salant, 2015). These
studies use optimal control theory and analyze the time path of pollution and permit prices as well
as decentralized behavior of polluters (e.g. Rubin, 1996; Cronshaw and Kruse, 1996). However, this
dynamic process is not relevant to the dynamic environmental damage of stock pollution that we discuss
here. In this paper, we do not consider permit banking in WQT.
82.2 Cost-Effectiveness Problem
Suppose that the regulator intends to control pollution in both a river and a receiving
lake. We index relevant polluters by i = 1, 2, ..., n from the upstream to the downstream
of the river, and the nth polluter locates closest to the lake. The pollutant flows to the
downstream, and its decay rate in the lake is γ. This decay rate tells how much of the
pollutant remains in the lake one period later, and is determined by physicochemical
properties of the pollutant and the aquatic ecosystem. The discount rate r describes
monetary depreciation in one period. A set of transfer coefficients is introduced to
capture how much of the pollutant from polluter i, after decaying and being assimilated
in the river, ends up arriving at polluter j. We denote this transfer coefficient as τij
with τij ≤ 1.3 We further denote the transfer coefficient to the lake as τis. If the nth
polluter is located at the lake, then τns = 1. The unregulated emission level of polluter
i is e0i , and the initial pollutant stock in the lake is S0. The pollutant stock in the lake
at time t is S(t). Polluter i’s abatement effort at time t is ai(t), and its abatement cost
is Ci (ai(t)). Assume that abatement costs of all polluters are strictly increasing and
strictly convex in abatement.
We assume that environmental damage caused by flow pollution (which will be
referred to as river damage) and stock pollution (which will be referred to as lake
damage) are both linear in concentration, so that polluters have constant marginal
impact on the environment. Denote di as the environmental damage coefficient of
river damage caused by the emission from polluter i, measured in dollar per unit of
the pollutant. This coefficient integrates all downstream environmental damage caused
by polluter i. In this sense, polluter i generates river damage Di(t) at time t, where
3 Farrow et al. (2005) describe how to compute transfer coefficients in the river. They first calculate
the pollutant concentration C (mg/L) at distance n (m) downstream from a pollution location i:
Cni =
ei
Q
e−kθ
(T−20) n
U ,
where ei (kg/day) is the discharge rate at the location i, Q (m
3/day) is the stream flow, k (day−1)
is the nominal decay rate, θ is the sensitivity coefficient of k to a temperature T (Celsius), and U
(meters/day) is the stream velocity. They then compute the transfer coefficient between the location i
and the location j using: τij =
Cji
C0i
.
This transfer coefficient can be improved by including the time effect of the pollutant moving from
the location i to the location j. The modified transfer coefficient is τije
−rq, where r is the discount rate,
and q is the average time which takes the pollutant to flow from the location i to the location j.
9Di(t) = di(e
0
i − ai(t)). The environmental damage coefficient of lake damage is δ, and
δS(t) stands for the lake damage at time t. Lake damage depends on the pollutant
stock, not flow. Although using a nonlinear function to describe environmental damage
appears more precise (e.g. Dechert and O’Donnell, 2006; Laukkanen and Huhtala, 2008),
a linear functional form for environmental damage is also common in the literature.4
Besides, Kolstad (1996) finds that damage of some pollutants like greenhouse gas
is quite linear over a fairly broad range of the current stock. Also, a significant linear
relationship may exist between some pollutants, like arsenic and heavy metal, and their
effect on health consequences (Mazumder, 2005; Ergene et al., 2007).
1. Flow Pollution Only
Following Farrow et al. (2005), we start with a cost-effectiveness problem of flow
pollution in which stock pollution is not considered. The regulator attempts to minimize
total abatement cost subject to a constraint D¯ on river damage in each period t. The
problem is below:
min
{a1(t),a2(t),...,an(t)}
n∑
i=1
Ci(ai(t))
s.t.
n∑
i=1
di
(
e0i − ai(t)
) ≤ D¯F ,
ai(t) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
(A)
Farrow et al. (2005) solve this problem and find that the marginal cost to reduce river
damage is equal everywhere in the solution to the problem above. The corresponding
least-cost marginal cost ratio is:
C
′
i(a
∗
i (t))
C
′
j(a
∗
j (t))
=
di
dj
, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. (2.1)
2. Stock Pollution Only
We continue with a cost-effectiveness problem of stock pollution in which flow pol-
lution is not considered. Regarding persistent environmental damage of lake pollution,
the regulator limits the discounted total lake damage over time to D¯S . The pollutant
accumulates according to the state equation: S˙(t) = −γS(t) + ∑ni=1 τis (e0i − ai(t)).
4 To name a few examples: Ribaudo et al. (1994), Hoel and Schneider (1997), Baudry (2000), Parry
et al. (2003), Matsueda et al. (2006), Dellink et al. (2008), Masoudi et al. (2015)
10
The problem is below:
min
{a1(t),a2(t),...,an(t)}
∫ +∞
0
e−rt
n∑
i=1
Ci(ai(t)) dt
s.t. S˙(t) = −γS(t) +
n∑
i=1
τis
(
e0i − ai(t)
)
,∫ +∞
0
e−rtδS(t) dt ≤ D¯S ,
ai(t) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
(B)
The integrand function in the objective is strictly convex. The feasible set of the problem
is closed and bounded. The pollutant stock is also bounded for all admissible pairs
across time. By the Filippov-Cesari Existence Theorem, a solution to Problem C always
exists. Mangasarian conditions also ensure that this solution is unique. The most rapid
approach path can achieve the optimality of this problem, where the solution in the
steady state is available in the appendix. The least-cost marginal cost ratio in the
steady-state solution to this cost-effectiveness problem is:
C
′
i(a
∗
i (t))
C
′
j(a
∗
j (t))
=
τis
τjs
, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. (2.2)
3. Flow Pollution and Stock Pollution
Given the analysis above, it is relatively easy to derive the solution to a cost-
effectiveness problem, where the regulator aims at both flow pollution and stock pollu-
tion. A constraint D¯ is imposed on the discounted total environmental damage of both
river pollution and lake pollution over time (which will be referred to as total damage).
The regulator solves the following problem:
min
{a1(t),a2(t),...,an(t)}
∫ +∞
0
e−rt
n∑
i=1
Ci(ai(t))dt
s.t. S˙(t) = −γS(t) +
n∑
i=1
τis
(
e0i − ai(t)
)
,
∫ +∞
0
e−rt
(
n∑
i=1
Di + δS(t)
)
dt ≤ D¯,
Di(t) = di
(
e0i − ai(t)
)
, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}
ai(t) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
(C)
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The most rapid approach path can achieve the optimality of this problem. Solving
the first-order conditions, the marginal cost to diminish the total damage, is the same
everywhere in the steady-state solution to the problem above. The marginal cost ratio
in the steady-state solution is:
C
′
i(a
∗
i (t))
C
′
j(a
∗
j (t))
=
di +
δ
r + γ
τis
dj +
δ
r + γ
τjs
, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. (2.3)
The marginal cost ratios in the equations (2.1)-(2.3) reflect the relationship of steady-
state abatement efforts among polluters in the cost-effective solutions to Problem (A)-
(C) respectively, where Problem (A) only considers flow pollution, Problem (B) only
considers stock pollution, and Problem (C) considers both.
2.3 Water Quality Trading
Water quality trading is a market-based instrument for pollution control, where polluters
can trade permits with each other. The possession of these permits endows polluters
with the right to discharge a certain level of emission. The initial allocation of permits
to polluters is l¯ = (l¯1, l¯2, ..., l¯n). Polluters can also create permits by their pollution
abatement.5 Given that water pollutant is not uniformly mixed, permits of different
polluters cannot be traded on a one-to-one basis. Trading ratios are introduced to solve
the non-uniform mixing problem in WQT. The ratios are akin to exchange rates of
permits among individual polluters. Denote the trading ratio between polluter i and
polluter j as κij . Taking κij = 2 as an example, it means that one permit of polluter
j allows polluter i to discharge two times as much of the pollutant as polluter j. Or,
put the other way, one permit of polluter i grants polluter j the right to emit half as
much as polluter j does. In the regulatory framework of WQT, trading ratios and the
amount of permits are exogenously determined by the regulator.
Assuming that there is no permit banking or borrowing in WQT, each polluter faces
5 In some literature, when a permit is created by reducing pollution, it is called “credit” which is
tradable in permit trading, too.
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the following problem each period:
min
rki,rsi,rji
Ci(ai)− pirsi +
∑
j 6=i
pjrji
s.t.
(
e0i − rki
)−∑
j 6=i
κjirji ≤ 0,
rsi + rki = l¯i + ai,
rki, rsi, rji ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n},
(D)
where rsi is the permits sold by polluter i, rki is the permits kept by polluter i, rji is
the permits that polluter i purchases from polluter j, and pi is the price on permit of
polluter i.
An equilibrium in the permit-trading market is defined as follows: Given a matrix of
trading ratios κ and the amount of permits to polluters l¯, an equilibrium in the a permit
market is a vector of permit prices p, a vector of polluters’ abatement a and a sequence
of trading activities {rsi, {rji}j 6=i}ni=1, where (i) a and {rsi, {rji}j 6=i}ni=1 solve Problem
(D) for every polluter, and (ii)
∑
i 6=j rji ≤ rsj for every polluter j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and the
equality holds when pj > 0. Because the feasible set of Problem (D) is compact, the
objective function is continuous and convex in abatement and linear in trading activities,
permit-trading equilibrium always exists. Although this equilibrium is not necessarily
unique, as the trading activities {rsi, {rji}j 6=i}ni=1 could have multiple combinations, the
abatement vector a is unique in the equilibrium.6 Assuming there is no permit banking
or borrowing, the abatement levels and the marginal cost ratio in the equilibrium at
time t are:
a∗∗i (t) = C
′−1
i (pi(t)), ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} ,
C
′
i(a
∗∗
i (t))
C
′
j(a
∗∗
j (t))
= κij(t), ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
(2.4)
2.3.1 Trading Ratios
Trading ratios and the initial endowment of permits are critical in an equilibrium of
a permit market. They also determine whether the cost-effective outcome of pollu-
tion control is achievable in WQT. Given that the abatement vector is unique both
6 The first-order conditions of Problem (D) have n2 + 2n unknowns and
(
n2 + 5n
)
/2 non-identical
equations, so the solution {ai, rsi, {rji}j 6=i}ni=1 is not unique for n ≥ 3.
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in the solution to a cost-effectiveness problem of pollution control and in permit-
trading equilibrium, we focus on the steady-state trading ratio here, which should be
κij(t) = C
′
i(a
∗
i (t))/C
′
j(a
∗
j (t)) to attain the cost-effective outcome. In the following, we
want to show that by setting κij in this way, the net change of environmental damage
induced by permit trading in the steady state is zero, and the total amount of per-
mits can be appropriately determined under different limits on environmental damage
of water pollution.
Suppose, for example, that there are two polluters in WQT at time t, and polluter
i purchases permits from polluter j. Polluter i, having obtained these permits, can
now emit additional discharge ∆ei(t), while polluter j forgoes these permits so he must
generate additional abatement ∆aj(t). The ratio between ∆aj(t) and ∆ei(t) is the
trading ratio κij .
1. Flow Pollution Only
We first begin with WQT which focuses only on flow pollution. The change in the
river damage during permit trading in every period t is:
∆DF (t) = di∆ei(t)− dj∆aj(t).
By setting κij(t) equal to the least-cost ratio in (2.1), any set of permissible trades will
lead to ∆DF (t) = 0. The contemporary incremental river damage in a permit market
at time t is offset. The cost-effective outcome of pollution control over river pollution
can be achieved through WQT (Farrow et al., 2005). The proper trading ratio and the
amount of permits at time t are below:
κij(t) =
di
dj
, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n},
n∑
i=1
di l¯i(t) ≤ D¯F ,
(2.5)
where D¯F is the constraint on the river damage per period.
2. Stock Pollution Only
We continue with WQT which looks only at stock pollution, without considering flow
pollution. The effect of stock pollution on the environment persists over time. At time
t, the additional emission ∆ei(t) and the additional abatement ∆aj(t) also influence the
path of the pollutant stock over time. Denote the impact of ∆ei(t) on the instantaneous
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change of the pollutant stock as ∆S(ei(t), t). Similarly, denote the impact of ∆aj(t) on
the instantaneous change of the pollutant stock as ∆S(aj(t), t). The increment in the
discounted lake damage over time is:
∆DS =
∫ +∞
0
e−rtδ∆S(ei(t), t) dt−
∫ +∞
0
e−rtδ∆S(aj(t), t) dt.
When κij(t) is set to the cost-effective marginal cost ratio in (2.2), any set of permissible
trades will lead to ∆DS = 0. The continuous incremental damage over time is offset.
We can set trading ratios and the initial endowment of permits at time t as follows, and
the cost-effective outcome of pollution control will be achieved:
κij(t) =
τis
τjs
, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n},
n∑
i=1
δ
r + γ
τis l¯i(t) ≤
(
D¯S − δS0
r + γ
)
r,
(2.6)
where S0 is the initial lake pollutant stock, and D¯S is the limit on the discounted total
lake damage.
3. Flow Pollution and Stock Pollution
Given the discussion above, we can now analyze WQT that targets both flow pollu-
tion and stock pollution. The change in the discounted total damage is:
∆D = di∆ei(t) +
∫ +∞
0
e−rtδ∆S(ei(t), t) dt− dj∆aj(t)−
∫ +∞
0
e−rtδ∆S(aj(t), t) dt.
When κij(t) equals the optimal marginal cost ratio in (2.3), any permissible set of trades
will lead to ∆D = 0. An increase in the discounted total damage is cancelled out by a
decrease in the discounted total damage during permit trading. The following trading
ratios and the endowment of permits can attain the cost-effective outcome of pollution
control over flow pollution and stock pollution:
κij(t) =
di +
δ
r + γ
τis
dj +
δ
r + γ
τjs
, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n},
n∑
i=1
(
di +
δ
r + γ
τis
)
l¯i(t) ≤
(
D¯ − δS0
r + γ
)
r,
(2.7)
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where D¯ is the upper bound on the discounted total damage. Based on the analysis
above, we can summarize that:
Conclusion 1. Suppose a river flows into a lake, and a pollutant causes damage both
in the river and the lake. Environmental damage of flow pollution and of stock pollution
are linear in concentration. Water quality trading can achieve the cost-effective outcome
of pollution control. Regarding different aims of the regulator, whether to protect the
river, the lake or both, the proper trading ratio and the proper vector of permits are
specified in (2.5), (2.6), and (2.7) respectively.
2.3.2 Interaction Between Flow Pollution And Stock Pollution
Environmental damage caused by flow pollution and stock pollution is not necessarily
the same in its degree of severity. Stock pollution is determined by the pollutant stock,
where the initial stock and the decay rate of the pollutant play an important role, while
flow pollution depends merely on the pollutant flow. A certain level of reduction in the
discharge from polluters may be sufficient to achieve a given level of water quality in the
river, but not sufficient to solve water deterioration in the lake if the initial pollutant
stock is high. When considering the entire water system, the degree of heterogeneity in
environmental damage might be even greater.
In a combined river-lake system, the regulator tends to have multiple constraints
on the river damage and the lake damage, rather than a single constraint on the total
damage. Take the eutrophication problem of the Mississippi River and the Gulf of
Mexico as an example. The Mississippi River carries millions of tons of nutrients into
the Gulf of Mexico every year, causing the “dead zone” around the Gulf. There is
an established target of 45% reduction in riverine total nitrogen and riverine total
phosphorus to solve this stock pollution in the Gulf of Mexico. To meet this target,
the United States Federal government has been prompted to carry out a Gulf Hypoxia
Action Plan covering all watersheds upstream. Regardless of this Action Plan, the state
governments of, for example, the Upper Mississippi River watershed such as Minnesota,
Iowa and Illinois, may have additional pollution control targets for water quality of their
local rivers. In this sense, the social cost-effectiveness problem still focuses on both flow
pollution and stock pollution, but has separate constraints on environmental damage
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caused by these two types of pollution. We describe the problem as follows:
min
{a1(t),a2(t),...,an(t)}
∫ +∞
0
e−rt
n∑
i=1
Ci(ai(t))dt
s.t. S˙(t) = −γS(t) +
n∑
i=1
τis
(
e0i − ai(t)
)
,
n∑
i=1
di
(
e0i − ai(t)
) ≤ D¯F , ∫ +∞
0
e−rtδS(t)dt ≤ D¯S ,
ai(t) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
(D)
where D¯F is the limit on the river damage in each period, and the D¯S is the limit on
the discounted lake damage over time.
Solving the cost-effectiveness problem of pollution control under the two constraints
above, we will have the following marginal cost ratio:
C
′
i(a
∗
i (t))
C
′
j(a
∗
j (t))
=
λ¯Fdi +
λ¯Sδ
r + γ
τis
λ¯Fdj +
λ¯Sδ
r + γ
τjs
, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, (2.8)
where λ¯F is the Lagrange multiplier of the river damage constraint and λ¯S is the La-
grange multiplier of the lake damage constraint. If one of the constraints is slack, the
problem degenerates to a prior problem discussed already in this paper. Compared with
the marginal cost ratio in the scenarios when there is a single constraint on environmen-
tal damage, the ratio here contains λ¯F and λ¯S . To properly figure out λ¯F and λ¯S , we
need to know the abatement cost information of polluters. Given the analysis above,
we summarize:
Conclusion 2. Suppose a river flows into a lake, and a pollutant causes damage both
in the river and the lake. Environmental damage of flow pollution and of stock pollution
are both linear. Water quality trading can achieve the cost-effective outcome of pollution
control when there are separate constraints on environmental damage caused by flow
pollution and stock pollution. However, it requires complete information on polluters’
abatement costs to figure out the proper trading ratios as specified in (2.8), and the
permits
∑n
i=1
(
λ¯Fdi +
λ¯Sδ
r+γ τis
)
l¯i(t) ≤
(
D¯ − λ¯SδS0r+γ
)
r, where D¯ = λ¯F D¯F + λ¯SD¯S.
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Figure 2.1: Correlation between River Damage and Lake Damage
Environmental damage caused by flow pollution and stock pollution is intercon-
nected. In this paper, the river and the lake are linked, so a change in riverine water
quality moves together with a change in lake water quality. Figure 2.1 shows all possible
combinations of flow pollution and stock pollution, as indicated by the blue area. In the
figure, D0S and D
1
S are the lower and the upper bounds of the discounted lake damage
over time respectively, D0F /r and D
1
F /r are the lower and the upper bounds of the dis-
counted river damage over time. When the regulator only focuses on controlling river
pollution, the result of WQT will appear at a point on the upper curve from (D0F /r,D
0
S)
to (D1F /r,D
1
S) in Figure 1. When the regulator only looks at lake pollution, the result
of WQT will come up at a point on the lower curve in the figure. Moreover, if the
constraints D¯S and D¯F /r are set outside the blue area, for example, at the point A,
at least one of the constraints is redundant. If the constraints D¯S and D¯F /r are given
inside the blue area, for example, at the point B, complete cost information on polluters
is needed to arrive at this point in efficient permit trading. The dashed curve in the
figure displays the possible combinations of river damage and lake damage when there
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is a single target at the total damage. If B sits further above this dashed curve, D¯F will
become more stringent to achieve than D¯S , and the ratio of λ¯F /λ¯S will be higher. The
corresponding marginal cost ratio and total abatement cost in the optimal solution to
achieve B will approach to the ones which only focus on the river damage.
2.3.3 Further Consideration on Stock Pollution
The distinction between flow pollution and stock pollution lies in persistence of their
environmental damage, and should be considered in solving the non-uniform mixing
water pollution problem. This non-uniform mixing problem occurs due to a large degree
of diversity in the marginal environmental damage caused by the discharge from different
locations. The area being affected, the physicochemical properties of pollutants and the
duration of environmental damage all depend on this diversity. In this sense, if we do
not consider the difference between flow pollution and stock pollution in persistence of
environmental damage, we will fail to properly solve the non-uniform mixing problem
of water pollution in permit trading.
Stock pollution can appear in many other forms in practice, besides lake contam-
ination. For example, groundwater contamination also belongs to stock pollution, as
pollutants accumulate in groundwater which consistently affect drinking water quality
as well as soil quality. However, the public have not paid attention to the environmental
damage caused by groundwater contamination as well as the expensive treatment cost
of groundwater pollutants until recently. In cooperation with EPA, New England Inter-
state Water Pollution Control Commission (2001) educates K-12 students in protecting
water, and mentions that “(f)or too long, our ground water resources have been out of
sight and out of mind, as is often the case, our wake-up call has come in the form of
accumulated ground water pollution crises.”
Considering multiple sources of stock pollution, it is possible that tradable permit
programs in practice may either ignore the existence of stock pollution or do not consider
persistence of environmental damage caused by stock pollution. For example, some
tradable permit programs tend to consider only transfer coefficients and the uncertainty
between sellers and buyers, in designing trading ratios, without regard to the discount
rate and the initial pollutant stock in terms of stock pollution. Some trading programs
even use uniform trading ratios, neglecting the location of polluters (Ohio Environmental
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Protection Agency, 2007; Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 2011; Corrales et al.,
2013; Kellre et al. 2014).
We may also consider the case in which a regulator controls the instantaneous water
quality in the river and the lake, but fail to account for persistence of pollutant in the
lake in this case. The wrong cost-effectiveness problem will be:
min
{a1(t),a2(t),...,an(t)}
n∑
i=1
Ci(ai(t))
s.t.
n∑
i=1
di
(
e0i − ai(t)
)
+ δS(t) ≤ D¯,
S =
n∑
i=1
τis
(
e0i − ai(t)
)
,
ai(t) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
(E)
The corresponding “efficient” trading ratio to achieve the least-cost outcome of Problem
(E) is:
κij(t) =
di + δτis
dj + δτjs
, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. (2.9)
Compared with the cost-effective trading ratio in (2.3), the decay rate γ and the discount
rate r are missing here. This is because the regulator does not account for the dynamic
process and the continuous environmental damage of stock pollution when establishing
permit trading. Unless r + γ = 1 or τis = 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, this trading ratio cannot
lead to the cost-effective outcome of pollution control. If r + γ = 1, the continuous
environmental damage of stock pollution in the next period will vanish after discounting
and pollutant decay. Consider the case in which γ = 0 and r = 1. In this case, although
the pollutant lasts forever in the lake, the discounted lake damage over time equals
its damage in the current period, because people are all extremely impatient. The
influence of stock pollution is essentially the same as that of flow pollution. If τis = 0,
∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, then polluters are so far upstream along the river that the amount of
the pollutant arriving at the lake is trivial. Given the analysis above, we summarize:
Conclusion 3. Suppose a river flows into a lake, and a pollutant causes damage
both in the river and the lake. Environmental damage of flow pollution and of stock
pollution are both linear. If the regulator solves both flow pollution and stock pollution,
but does not account for persistence of environmental damage in the lake, water quality
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trading will not arrive at the cost-effective outcome of pollution control, unless r+γ = 1
or τis = 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
2.4 Simulation
This section presents results of a simulation on permit trading in a segment of the
Ohio River, when the difference between flow pollution and stock pollution is or is not
considered. In the simulation, all polluters in the permit-trading system are located
along the river, and their emissions can be monitored. In the rest of this section, we
will clarify the assumption and the parameters used in the simulation, and then analyze
the results of permit trading under different scenarios.
We assume a homogeneous abatement cost function for every polluter. A heteroge-
nous abatement cost function is not necessary for permit trading to occur here. The
form of this cost function is:
C(ai) = α+ βai + ξ
(
e0 − ai
)
ln
(
1− ai
e0
)
,
where e0 is the unregulated emission level, α is the fixed cost of abatement, α ≥ 0,
β > 0, ξ > 0, and β > ξ. The marginal cost is strictly positive and infinitely large for
complete abatement.
Although the values of environmental damage coefficients are assumed here, we think
it worthwhile to discuss the method of computing these values if there is empirical data.
It will help understand the meaning of these coefficients. The environmental damage
coefficient of flow pollution di (which will be referred to as river damage coefficient)
integrates all the marginal environmental damage over the downstream area of the
river. This coefficient is related to the size of downstream area, the transfer coefficients
of pollutants, the influence on public health and the economy attributed by pollutants,
and other relevant factors. Farrow et al. (2005) describe the river damage coefficient as
follows:
di =
m∑
k=0
ω · hk · τik · 1
Q0i
,
where m is the total amount on stream segments downstream of polluter i, ω ($ ·
(kg/m3)−1) is the marginal value of a change in riverine water quality and is measured
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by willingness-to-pay of a resident for an improvement in riverine water quality, hk is
the number of residents being affected by river pollution in the kth stream segment, Q0i
(m3/day) is the stream flow at polluter i, τik is the transfer coefficient from polluter
i to the kth stream segment. The location of polluter i is defined as the 0th stream
segment. The environmental damage coefficient of stock pollution (also referred to as
lake damage coefficient), can be derived in a similar way:7
δ =
m∑
k=1
ω · hk · 1
Qs
,
where m is the total number of the segments around the lake, ω ($ · (kg/m3)−1) is the
willingness-to-pay of a resident for an improvement in water quality of the lake, hk is
the number of residents being affected by lake pollution in the kth segment, and Qs
(m3) is the volume of water in the lake.
The parameters in the simulation are presented in Table 2.1. Taking advantage of
the empirical example in the Farrow et al. (2005) based on the total sewer overflow
in the Upper Ohio River Basin, we directly take their values on the river damage co-
efficients (with the coefficient on Clairton, Pennsylvania being normalized to one) and
also their unregulated emission levels. The transfer coefficients to the lake are assumed
sequentially downstream. The other parameters are assumed to take the values below
unless specified.
7 According to the definition of the lake damage coefficient, we have:
δ =
m∑
k=1
‖∂V (W,hk)
∂S
‖ =
m∑
k=1
‖∂V (W,hk)
∂W
∂W
∂Ck
∂Ck
∂S
‖ =
m∑
k=1
‖(ω · hk) · (−1) · 1
Qks
‖,
where V (·) is the benefit function of water quality improvement which depends on water quality W
and the population of residents hk. The derivative of water quality with respect to the pollutant
concentration Ck in the kth segment is assumed -1 uniformly in the lake damage coefficient.
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Table 2.1: Parameters in the Simulation on Permit Trading
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
d1 1.62 ($/kg) τ1s 0.10 δ 5 ($/kg)
d2 2.21 ($/kg) τ2s 0.15 r 0.05
d3 1.00 ($/kg) τ3s 0.20 γ 0.40
d4 0.38 ($/kg) τ4s 0.25 e
0 231 (kg)
d5 3.99 ($/kg) τ5s 0.30 S0 10 (ton)
d6 0.36 ($/kg) τ6s 0.35 α 100
d7 1.40 ($/kg) τ7s 0.40 β 1
d8 0.03 ($/kg) τ8s 0.45 ξ 1
Given that all polluters in the simulation have the same abatement cost functions,
their contribution to pollution control in an efficient solution primarily depends on their
environmental damage coefficients. In the absence of a regulation, the river damage in
every period is $2,538, and the discounted lake damage over time is $224,040. When
the regulator aims at, for example, a 30% reduction in the river damage, polluter 5, in a
cost-effective solution, must abate the most in its emission, i.e. 106.5 kg in every period.
This is because the marginal river damage brought by polluter 5 is the highest among
all polluters. When the regulator intends to meet, for example, a 30% reduction in the
discounted lake damage over time, polluter 8 contributes the most in a cost-effective
solution, i.e. abatement of 169.9 kg in each period. This is because polluter 8 has
the largest proportion of its emission contributing to the lake damage. For any set of
targets for pollution control, the relative relationship of polluters’ marginal contribution
is unchanged in an efficient solution to the problem of environmental improvement,
which is determined by polluters’ environmental damage coefficients in the simulation.
23
Figure 2.2: Relative Permit Prices of Polluters under Different Scenarios
In the simulation, the permit prices reflect the degree of the importance of each
polluter’s abatement efforts to alleviate environmental damage. Because the relative
relationship of polluters’ marginal contribution is constant in an efficient solution, for
any set of pollution control targets, the relative permit prices in the corresponding
efficient permit trading are constant, too. Figure 2.2 displays these relative permit
prices in the market, with the permit price of polluter 1 being normalized to one. In
a permit market which derives the cost-effective outcome of pollution control only over
river pollution, without considering water quality in the lake (which will be referred
to as the river market), the permit prices of polluter 5 and polluter 8 are the highest
and the lowest respectively among all polluters. In a permit market which attains the
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cost-effective outcome of pollution control only over lake pollution, without considering
water quality along the river (which will be referred to as the lake market), polluter
1 and polluter 8 have the lowest and the highest permit prices. Based on the prior
analysis, all these relative permit prices correspond to their trading ratios, which are
related to the ratios of river damage coefficients and the ratios of the transfer coefficients
to the lake.
In a permit market which induces the cost-effective outcome of pollution over the
discounted total damage (which will be referred to as the all-inclusive market), the
relative permit prices appear between those of the river market, as indicated by the
red line, and the lake market, as indicated by the blue line. The relative prices in the
all-inclusive market take account of polluters’ marginal effect on both river pollution
and lake pollution.
The dashed line in Figure 2.2 is the relative prices in a permit market, where per-
sistence of lake damage is not accounted for (which will be referred to as no-persistence
market). Without considering the continuous environmental damage caused by lake
pollution in permit trading, polluters’ ability to improve the environment is incorrectly
estimated. The corresponding permit prices are distorted and cannot reflect polluters’
actual influence on environmental damage. For example, in the all-inclusive market as
indicated by the green line in Figure 2.2, the permit prices of polluter 1 and polluter 4
are very close, since these two polluters have similar level of marginal impact on the to-
tal damage. However, in the no-persistence market, polluter 4’s contribution to reduce
the continuous environmental damage of lake pollution has not been accounted for, and
its relative permit price turns out lower as a result. Compared with the all-inclusive
market, the relative permit prices in the no-persistence market are closer to those of the
river market.
In the no-persistence market, the non-uniform mixing problem of water pollution in
permit trading is not properly solved. The cost-effective outcome of pollution control is
not achieved via this market. The continuous environmental damage of lake pollution
is not considered in the no-persistence market, which is influenced by the lake damage
coefficient δ, the discount rate r, the decay rate γ, and the initial pollutant stock S0.
Figure 2.3 compares the total abatement cost of the no-persistence market relative to
that of the all-inclusive market under these four parameters. We refer this difference
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in their abatement costs as the cost difference. This cost difference is always positive
because the abatement cost of the no-persistence market is at least as high as that of the
all-inclusive market. More graphs of the cost difference are available in the appendix.
(a) δ (b) r
(c) γ (d) S0
Figure 2.3: The Cost Difference between No-persistence Market and All-Inclusive Mar-
ket
The cost difference in Figure 2.3 has an inverse-U shape, and its maximum value
is affected by the parameters related to the continuous environmental damage of lake
pollution. When a reduction target for pollution control approaches to zero, the cost
difference will decrease because polluters’ behaviors in the no-persistence market and in
the all-inclusive market are akin to those in the unregulated scenario. When a reduction
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target for pollution control is sufficiently high, the cost difference will also decline since
almost everyone approaches complete abatement. This gives an inverse-U shape to
the cost difference in Figure 2.3. Moreover, the lake damage coefficient δ, the decay
rate γ and the discount rate r can all alter the maximum of the cost difference. For
example, the maximum of the cost difference is higher under a lower decay rate. This is
because a lower decay rate leads to greater continuous environmental damage caused by
lake pollution, and the absence of considering this continuous damage creates a larger
distortion in the trading ratios from those in the all-inclusive market. However, the
initial pollutant stock S0 does not change the maximum of the cost difference, in that it
does not affect the marginal contribution of polluters in the environment, and does not
bring about a greater distortion in the trading ratios from the efficient ones. Although
this cost difference in Figure 2.3 is small relative to the total abatement cost, it proves
that the non-uniform mixing problem is not solved in permit trading.
Figure 2.3 also indicates that the maximum achievable reduction target for pollution
control varies, depending on the parameters related to the continuous environmental
damage of lake pollution. The total damage involves the continuous environmental
damage caused by polluters in the lake and also the continuous environmental damage
generated by the initial pollutant stock S0 in the lake. Regarding this initial pollutant
stock, it can be only removed through the decaying of the pollutant itself. In this sense,
the higher the continuous environmental damage caused by S0 relative to the total
damage, the lower the maximum reduction target for pollution control can be attained
by polluters.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper points out the necessity of including both flow pollution and stock pollu-
tion in solving the non-uniform mixing problem of water pollution. Previous studies on
WQT develop trading ratios to account for the diversity in the degree of environmental
damage caused by emissions from different locations, but most neglect heterogeneity in
persistence of environmental damage. This paper contributes to the previous literature
on WQT by involving the difference of environmental damage persistence caused by
pollutants from different locations. The cost-effective pollution control outcome can be
27
achieved through permit trading, although complete information on polluters’ costs is
necessary when there are separate targets at flow pollution and stock pollution. This
paper derives the proper trading ratios of permit trading to meet the cost-effective
outcome of pollution control, under the linearity assumption on environmental dam-
age. Konishi et al. (2015) point out the difficulty of deriving proper damage-based
trading ratios without this linearity assumption in attaining the cost-effective outcome
of pollution control. They conclude that in the presence of nonlinear environmental
damage, the trading ratios are not necessarily independent of individual emissions, and
deriving these ratios also requires complete information on polluters’ costs. Nonlinear
environmental damage of stock pollution also requires time-dependent trading ratios.
Further research is necessary to develop proper trading ratios that can assist to arrive
at the cost-effective outcome of pollution control under a less stringent assumption on
environmental damage.
Chapter 3
Reliable Reduction in
Agricultural Runoff under
Environmental Uncertainty
3.1 Introduction
In the 2012 National Water Quality Inventory conducted by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA), agricultural activity was identified as the top source of impairments
in rivers and streams, and the third source of impairments in lakes, reservoirs, and ponds.
Excessive nutrients in agriculture runoff are linked to eutrophication, as well as other
problems that negatively affect aquatic biomes and degrade ecosystem services. Between
2000 and 2015, about 0.8 million metric tons of nitrogen (nitrate and nitrite) entered
the Gulf of Mexico every year, which created a “Dead Zone” covering an area about
the size of Connecticut and Rhode Island combined (6,474 square miles) (United States
Geological Survey, 2015; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2015).
When the environment is uncertain, the effects of abatement efforts are likewise
uncertain. The current, common practice for pollution control is setting a determinis-
tic target for the average reduction in pollution over time. To some extent, Segerson
supports this practice by suggesting in her seminal paper (Segerson, 1988, p.91) that
“if the benefits of abatement are not known, the social planner could simply choose the
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level of abatement that would on average meet an exogenous target level of ambient
pollution.” Many following studies either take her suggestion or neglect environmental
uncertainty in the analysis of environmental policies, such as voluntary programs (e.g.,
Segerson and Wu, 2006), command and control (e.g., Rabotyagov et al., 2014), taxes
(e.g., Suter et al., 2009), water quality trading (e.g., Collentine and Johnsson, 2012) and
payments for ecosystem services (e.g., Carpentier et al., 1998; Khanna et al., 2003).
Although advances in biophysical and hydrological modeling can generate reasonable
estimates of the effect of farm management practices on agricultural runoff, the resulting
improvement in water quality cannot be known with certainty beforehand. Because an
average target does not adequately account for the stochastic nature of pollution control,
two issues arise. First, the probability of failure to meet a reduction is not directly
regulated. Therefore, meeting an average target can mean the target is met in a few
periods but missed in many other periods. Second, an average target does not describe
the whole picture of water quality improvement. Water quality improvement can come
from an average reduction in pollution over time. It can also come from a reduction
in the frequency of extreme runoff events. In particular, there are higher expectations
of extreme weather and climate events occurring in the future under climate change,
which may increase the likelihood of heavy rainfall. Under such circumstances, limiting
the occurrence of heavy runoff may be an important management goal.
The common management practice is to use a margin of safety with a reduction
target to address these issues. For example, the margin of safety is introduced as
a component of Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) to account for “uncertainty in
predicting how well pollutant reductions will result in meeting water quality standards”
(USEPA, ndb). The margin of safety is developed for reliability of pollution control,
limiting the frequency of extreme runoff events.
In this paper, I propose the use of a reliability target in controlling pollution re-
sulting from agricultural runoff, where reliability means achieving a given target with
a specified probability regardless of environmental changes. The main contribution of
this paper is to introduce and analyze a reliability constraint in a water pollution con-
trol model. The corresponding water quality improvement is thereby achieved with a
specified level of confidence. Rabotyagov et al. (2016) argue that this type of reliable
reduction target in pollutants can be used to improve the resiliency of ecosystem services
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such as improved water quality. Using this reliability target, the pollution control prob-
lem of agricultural runoff becomes an optimization problem with chance constraints,
i.e., Chance-Constrained Optimization.1
Solving a Chance-Constrained problem of pollution control often requires knowledge
of the probability distribution of pollution. Unfortunately, this information is typically
not available. The common practice in literature is to assume a specific probability
distribution for stochastic agricultural runoff. The chance constraint is then trans-
formed into a deterministic constraint using the probability distribution (e.g., Lichten-
berg and Zilberman, 1988; McSweeny and Shortle, 1990; Willis and Whittlesey, 1998;
Lacroix et al., 2005). However, solution validation depends on how well the distribu-
tional assumption approximates the actual. Roy (1952), on the other hand, develops
the Safety-First criterion in portfolio management without a distributional assumption.
This criterion is based on Chebyshev’s inequality, and can also be used in pollution con-
trol to derive a robust solution that protects against the worst case of all the possible
probability distributions. Roy’s method creates a feasible set that meets the chance
constraints for all possible probability distributions and is free from misidentification of
the actual probability distribution. The feasible set he generates is, nonetheless, much
smaller than that of the original chance-constrained problem, which normally leads to
tremendously expensive solutions. For this reason, Roy’s method has been criticized
as being overly conservative. Despite this weakness, the idea of his method is promis-
ing in environmental conservation, particularly when information on the distribution of
pollution is insufficient. In this paper, I alleviate the over-conservativeness problem of
Roy’s method by focusing on the right tail of the probability distribution of pollution,
which is more likely to result in disastrous consequences. Also, unlike previous stud-
ies I first consider the effect of abatement efforts, their combination, and their spatial
allocation on the variance of total pollution when determining a cost-effective solution
to a reliable reduction, without assuming any matrix of correlation coefficients among
individual emission sources.
1 The algorithms of Chance-Constrained Optimization might take an unreasonably long time to
reach a solution. Bertsimas et al. (2011) point out that a chance-constrained problem may be intractable.
This means that although the problem can be solved in theory, the solution algorithms might not be
completed in polynomial time.
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This paper emphasizes the importance of reliability of pollution control under en-
vironmental uncertainty, and contributes to develop a method to achieve a reliability
target when a probability distribution of pollution is unknown. The empirical study
focuses on the nitrogen runoff problem of the Wolf Creek Watershed in Iowa. Given the
current available farm-management practices, reliability of pollution control is costly to
achieve. To yield a 41% reduction in total pollution relative to the baseline level with
a 70% reliability, a 75% loss in agricultural profit relative to the baseline profit level
($59.8 million) must be undertaken, compared with 1.5% loss in agricultural profit ($1.2
million) to achieve a 41% average target. However, this reliability target attains the
41% pollution reduction in nine out of ten years during 2004-2013, while this average
target misses the 41% pollution reduction in five out of ten years during 2004-2013
with much higher unfilling gap. A reliability target is a valuable tool when consistently
meeting the target is important. Regarding policy implication, this paper suggests that
the requirement on reliability of pollution should be properly reflected by the value of
a margin of safety in Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDL).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 models the problem of pollution control
over agricultural runoff with a reliability target. Section 3 describes the sample area and
data. Section 4 uses simulation analysis to analyze the tradeoff between agricultural
runoff and agricultural profits in the sample area. Section 5 illustrates how the margin
of safety can be correctly set for a TMDL. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Reliability of Pollution Control
Consider a group of risk-neutral farmers. They try to maximize their profits while
controlling agricultural runoff. Let R be the aggregate runoff from those farmers, and
let R¯ be a specified reduction target, which is set by an environmental authority. The
aggregate runoff R depends on both the farm management decisions X and exogenous
uncertainty  in the environment, reflecting unpredictable weather and streamflow con-
ditions. The total profit of those farmers pi also depends on X and , where the crop
prices and the costs of different farm management options are assumed constant over
time.
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Segerson (1988) specifies a cost-effectiveness problem for the regulator, which max-
imizes the profit or minimizes the loss subject to a constraint on the expected amount
of pollution. She argues that the regulator could simply set a target level of reduction
that would be attained on average over time. Her approach has been followed by a
number of authors (e.g., Segerson and Wu, 2006; Rabotyagov et al., 2014; Suter et al.,
2009; Khanna et al., 2003; Carpentier et al., 1998). Let χ be the action space of all the
farmers, and the farm management decisions X ∈ χ. According to this specification,
there is only a quantitative target that limits the average runoff:2
max
X
E (pi(X; ))
s.t. E (R(X; )) ≤ R¯,
X ∈ χ.
(P1)
Although this problem setup considers the efforts to achieve the reduction targets
on average, it is not concerned with how reliable the efforts are, i.e., the probability
of a reduction target being achieved. But, water quality depends specifically upon
both a decline in the average pollutant amount and a decline in the occurrence of
heavy runoff. If heavy runoff events have disproportionate impacts on water quality,
it is important to consider these events in the optimization problem. The importance
of extreme events suggests a different target in pollution control, especially when the
variance of agricultural runoff is large.
3.2.1 Reliability Target
There are two methods to model farmers’ decisions regarding abatement practices un-
der environmental uncertainty. One method is discrete stochastic programming. In this
approach, deterministic constraints must be met in both discrete and stochastic scenar-
ios by choosing a specific option in each state. This paper does not use this approach
because it is difficult to define discrete scenarios and obtain the corresponding probabil-
ity of each scenario. Therefore, the second method, Chance-Constrained Programming
(CCP), is more appropriate. Let’s set an upper bound α on the probability that a
2 Usually there are more than one type of pollutant that need to be controlled in the runoff.
However, the number of pollutant types only changes the number of restrictions in the problem. It
does not fundamentally alter the problem setup. For parsimony, I focus on one type of pollutant in this
paper.
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reduction target is not attained in a period. In other words, a reduction target should
be achieved with an assurance level no less than 1− α. This probabilistic constraint is
called a reliability requirement. A reduction target R¯ and a reliability target α together
comprise a reliability target. The problem with a reliability target for pollution control
is:
max
X
E (pi(X; ))
s.t. P
(
R(X; ) ≥ R¯) ≤ α,
X ∈ χ.
(P2)
R
P (R)
RˆR¯
(a) An Average Target
R
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α
(b) A Reliability Target
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(c) Reliability Targets: Reduction
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(d) Reliability Targets: Reliability
Figure 3.1: Average Targets and Reliability Targets
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Figure 3.1 shows the difference between average targets and reliability targets in
pollution control. Typically, a reduction in pollution is accompanied by a reduction in
the variance of pollution, while the size of the variance reduction depends on different
abatement practices and their spatial allocation. Figure 3.1(a) displays an average
target that only limits the average pollutant runoff to R¯, regardless of the probability
in the right tail. However, a reliability target in Figure 3.1(b) concerns the right tail
of the runoff distribution. It restricts the probability of exceeding a reduction target
R¯ to a reliability requirement α which is represented by the red area. Figure 3.1(c)
shows the scenario that requires the same reliability level but more reduction. The
probability distribution of pollution moves further to the left, while keeping the same
probability of the right tail, i.e., the red area in the figure. Figure 3.1(d) displays
the scenario that requires a higher reliability but the same reduction. Previously, the
reliability requirement is α1, which is the sum of the pink area and the red area. The
new reliability requirement α2 is more stringent, and the new runoff distribution moves
further to the left. The pink area is not included in the new distribution at reliability
level α2.
3.2.2 Mean and Variance of Agricultural Runoff
Regardless of the complexity of the solution algorithms, CCP is challenging to solve
because there is limited information on the actual probability distribution of pollution in
the chance constraints. Rabotyagov et al. (2014) use a bootstrap procedure, and Lacroix
et al. (2005) use a Monte Carlo simulation based on the probability of the random
parameters, all in an attempt to approximate the actual probability distribution of
pollution. However, these methods only work well if there are plenty of observations, or
if the probability information on the parameters is accurate. In this paper, I solve CCP
based on the mean and the variance of agricultural runoff. Although this information is
still not sufficient to specify the actual probability distribution, it can be used to obtain
a robust solution to the CCP, which will be discussed shortly.
Except for a few cases where aggregate pollutant runoff is assumed to be a function
of normally distributed parameters, so that the mean and the variance can be calculated
directly from the function (e.g., Bystrom et al., 2000; Vasquez et al., 2000; Melching
and Bauwens, 2001; Tze Ling and Eheart, 2005), most studies make an additional
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assumption on the correlation among individual sources in the computation. The mean
and the variance of the aggregate runoff are:
µ(X; ) =
∑
i
diµi(xi; ),
σ2(X; ) =
∑
i
d2iσ
2
i (xi; ) +
∑
i 6=j
ρijdidjσi(xi; )σj(xj ; ),
where µi(xi) is the mean of pollutant runoff from source i, σi(xi; ) is the standard
deviation of pollutant runoff from source i, di is a delivery coefficient of the pollutant and
ρij is the correlation coefficient between source i and source j. Some authors assume that
runoff from individual sources is independent so that ρij = 0 for all i 6= j (e.g., Beavis
and Walker, 1983), while others impose a series of values on the correlation coefficients
(e.g., Lichtenberg and Zilberman, 1988; McSweeny and Shortle, 1990). More recently,
some authors have used a biophysical model to compute coefficients (e.g., Rabotyagov,
2010; Rabotyagov et al., 2014).
My approach differs in that I do not make an assumption on the correlation coef-
ficients among individual sources. Instead, the actual influence of abatement practices
and their spatial allocation on the mean and the variance of agricultural runoff is in-
cluded in the computation. Farmers make decisions on their land first, pollutant runoff
is summed up to the watershed level, and the mean and the variance are derived after-
ward:
µ(X; ) =
1
T
∑
t
∑
i
diRi,t(xi; ),
σ2(X; ) =
1
T − 1
∑
t
(∑
i
diRi,t(xi; )− µ(X; )
)2
,
where Ri,t(xi; ) is the individual runoff from source i in year t, and T is the length
of the sample time period. While this method increases the computational burden in
the optimization step, it avoids a subjective assumption about the correlation among
pollutant runoff from individual sources. It also provides a different perspective on com-
puting the variance: instead of figuring out the complex correlation among individual
sources, it directly calculates the variance of aggregate pollutant runoff.
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3.2.3 Robust Solution
If there is clear information on the probability distribution of agricultural runoff, for
example, a normal distribution, a chance constraint in pollution control can be trans-
formed into its equivalent which is a combination of the mean and the standard deviation
of agricultural runoff.3 Let φα be the critical value of the standard normal distribution
such that Φ(φα) = 1− α. The chance constraint in P2 becomes:
µ (X; ) + φασ(X; ) ≤ R¯. (3.1)
Compared with an average target, the reliability target adds a penalty φα on the stan-
dard deviation of pollution. The cost-effective farm management decisions are hence
determined by a balance among the marginal change in the expected profit, the marginal
change in the mean of pollution, and the marginal change in the variance of pollution.
Due to the uncertain relation between farm management and the variance of pollution
reduction, the marginal benefit or the marginal abatement cost in the cost-effective
solution could be higher or lower than without a reliability requirement.
Following the analysis above, a reliability target is not just making a more stringent
target for pollution control. Actually, an effort to meet a reliability target can be
decomposed into two aspects. On one hand, this effort is undertaken to implement
more conservative practices so as to meet a more stringent target (when a reliability
level is high). On the other hand, this effort is made to change the spatial distribution
of abatement practices in order to reduce the variance of total pollution. Regarding
specific abatement practices, unlike the scenario of meeting an average target, their
effect on both the expectation and the variance of pollution are considered in achieving
a reliability target. For example, two abatement practices generate the same expected
abatement cost. The one which reduces more pollution on average will be preferred
to meet an average target. However, it is not necessarily true for a reliability target,
because the practice which causes a slightly higher average pollution but a much lower
variance of pollution may be preferred to meet a reliability target.
However, whether or not the solution above is valid depends on how close the actual
distribution of pollution is to a normal distribution. Figure 3.2 displays three possible
3 Kampas and White (2003) think that the choice of a distributional assumption usually depends on
data availability and the concerns of the regulator or decision-makers. However, a normal distribution
is commonly chosen in previous studies for the reason of convenience.
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probability density functions, given the same farm management choices. These distri-
butions have the same mean and the same variance. The gray dashed curve is a normal
distribution. If the actual runoff is close to this distribution, the solution above meets
the reliability target: the probability of achieving a reduction target R¯ is greater than
1− α. However, the actual runoff does not necessarily follow a normal distribution. It
might be the red curve, which meets the reliability requirement. It might also be the
blue curve, which fails to attain the reliability target.
R
P (R)
α
R¯
Figure 3.2: Different Probability Distributions of Pollution
Without clear information on the probability distribution, Roy (1952) develops a
safety-first criterion to derive a robust solution to CCP. This criterion constructs a
feasible set to protect against the worst case of all possible distributions in the problem,
which is typically much smaller than the one of the original CCP. Therefore, Roy’s
method guarantees that no matter the distribution of agricultural runoff, the farm
management choices in the solution always meet the reliability target. Roy’s method is
based on the most common version of Chebyshev’s inequality:
P
( |R(X; )− µ(X; )|
σ(X; )
≥ δ
)
≤ 1
δ2
, (3.2)
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where δ ∈ R+. This inequality concerns the deviation of R(X; ) from µ(X; ) in both
directions and provides a maximum probability that R(X; ) falls out of a given range.
Using this inequality, the chance constraints in CCP are transformed into determin-
istic constraints, which are the sufficient but not necessary conditions of the chance
constraints. The problem with this method is that it is overly conservative. However,
the idea of constructing a feasible set to protect against the worst case of the possible
probability distributions in the problem is promising and reasonable in environmental
protection.
The present paper follows Roy’s idea and improves his method by using a robust
but less stringent transformation of the chance constraints. A regulator will only care
about one tail of the distribution: the probability of pollutant runoff being too large.
Because of this, there are two other inequalities that are preferred to use than the most
common version of Chebyshev’s inequality. One is Cantelli’s inequality, which is also
called the one-sided Chebyshev’s inequality:
P
(
R(X; )− µ(X; )
σ(X; )
≥ δ
)
≤ 1
1 + δ2
. (3.3)
The other is a semivariance inequality which is derived by Berck and Hihn (1982). This
semivariance is smaller than the variance because it only focuses on the deviation when
pollutant runoff is higher than the average:
P
(
R(X; )− µ(X; )
σˆ(X; )
≥ δ
)
≤ 1
δ2
,
where σˆ(X; ) =
√∫ +∞
µ(X;)
(R(X; )− µ(X; ))2 dF (R).
(3.4)
The proofs of Cantelli’s inequality and the semivariance inequality are available in the
appendix. These two inequalities focus only on the probability of heavy runoff and
apply to all possible distributions as long as their mean and variance exist.
Using inequality (3.3), the corresponding sufficient but not necessary condition of
the chance constraint is,
µ(X; ) +
√
1
α
− 1 σ(X; ) ≤ R¯.
Using inequality (3.4), the corresponding sufficient but not necessary condition of the
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chance constraint is,
µ(X; ) +
√
1
α
σˆ(X; ) ≤ R¯.
Combining the two inequalities, a robust transformation of the chance constraint is:
min
(
µ(X; ) +
√
1
α
− 1 σ(X; ), µ(X; ) +
√
1
α
σˆ(X; )
)
≤ R¯. (3.5)
The first formula tends to be the bound when total pollution has a smaller deviation
from both directions of greater than and smaller than the average. The second formula
tends to be bounded when total pollution has a smaller deviation from the direction of
greater than the average. In the following empirical study, the first formula is likely to
be the bound when a reliability level is not high, while the second formula is likely to
be bounded when a reliability level is high.
3.3 Empirical Application
The 2008 Gulf Hypoxia Action Plan sets a 45% target reduction in riverine nitrogen load
and riverine phosphorus load to control hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico and to improve
overall water quality (Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task Force,
2008). It asks for states along the Mississippi River to develop statewide nutrient
reduction strategies. Responding to the Action, the Iowa Department of Agriculture
and Land Stewardship and Iowa State University cooperated to assess the nutrient
loading from Iowa to the Mississippi River and also to study best management practices
(BMPs) for agriculture (Iowa State University Science Team, 2013). The study finds
that nonpoint sources should reduce nitrogen by 41% and phosphorus by 29% to achieve
a 45% total load reduction. Moreover, nine priority 8-digit Hydrological Unit Code
(HUC) watersheds were identified as part of the Iowa Nutrient Reduction Strategy.4
These watersheds were chosen according to “[nitrogen and phosphorus] loads and
concentrations, presence of point sources, landform distribution throughout the state,
and engagement of active, local groups within these watersheds” (Water Resources
Coordinating Council, 2014). The study area in the paper is the Wolf Creek Watershed,
4 An HUC consists of two to twelve digits. The more digits it has, the finer area it identifies. For
example, 2-digit HUC identifies at regional level, and 8-digit HUC identifies at subbasin level.
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displayed in Figure 3.3. It is located in the Middle Cedar River basin, one of the nine
priority watersheds. The entire watershed is in No. 104 Major Land Resource Area,
which is defined by a specific pattern of soil, climate, water resources and land use
(Natural Resources Conservation Service, nd).
Figure 3.3: The Wolf Creek Watershed in Iowa
The Wolf Creek Watershed includes 846 km2, i.e. 326.6 square miles. Using the
2008 Crop Data Layer as the baseline land cover, cropland is 83% of the overall wa-
tershed. I focus on controlling nitrogen in agricultural runoff in the study area, not
only because agriculture is the major contributor of nitrogen, but also because many
nitrogen compounds are soluble in water, which means they spread into a broader area
and cause health concerns (Powlson et al., 2008; Brender et al., 2013) . In the baseline
scenario where farmers do not take any abatement efforts, the aggregate annual crop
profit in the watershed is $79.6 million.
3.3.1 Soil and Water Assessment Tool
The study uses the Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) to simulate the impact
of farm management on crop production and agricultural runoff. The tool is actively
supported by the United States Department of Agriculture. After being developed for
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more than 30 years, this tool has proven to be an effective watershed-based hydrological
model for assessing water quality problems (Gassman et al., 2007). The inputs of
SWAT include watershed dimensions, climate, hydrologic cycle, sediments, nutrients,
pesticide, bacteria, water quality, plant, and farm management (Arnold et al., 2013). In
simulations, SWAT segregates a watershed into numerous hydrological response units
(HRUs), and estimates water and chemical movement at the HRU level. Within an
HRU, land use and soil conditions are homogenous. Dalzell et al. (2012) provide more
details of using SWAT in studying water pollution control.
3.3.2 Best Management Practices
Table 3.1: Abbreviations for Farm Management Alternatives
Abbreviation Farm Management
Ba Baseline
Ac All crop
Ct Conservation tillage
Nt No tillage
Gw Grassed waterways
Rf Reduced fertilizer
Cc Cover crop
Pr Prairie
Fd Forest
RN Reduced fertilizer and No tillage
RC Reduced fertilizer and Cover crop
NC No tillage and Cover crop
RNC Reduced fertilizer, No tillage, and Cover crop
The SWAT model in this paper contains 13 farm management alternatives, including the
baseline scenario where farmers make no abatement efforts. These alternatives involve
three categories of BMPs: One is land retirement, the conversion of cropland into prairie
or forest; another is structured practices, such as tillage and cover crop, which changes
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the configuration of landscape and is easily observable; the third is non-structured
practices such as reduced application rate of fertilizer, which is not observable.
Table 4.2 lists the abbreviations for all farm management alternatives. The de-
scription of each alternative is available in the appendix. Among the available farm
management options, planting cover crops seems promising to control nutrient runoff.
However, there is currently no agreement on how cover crops impact crop yields. The
Iowa Nutrient Reduction Strategy reports an average 6% reduction in corn yield fol-
lowing a rye cover crop. By contrast, the Conservation Technology Information Center
(2015) reports a 2.1% increase in corn yield and a 4.2% increase in soybean yield fol-
lowing cover crops. Learning Farms and Practical Farmers of Iowa (2015) provides a
possible explanation of such divergence: the difference in crop yields is due to whether
or not a cover crop is properly managed. For example, if a rye cover crop fails to be
terminated completely by herbicide, it is likely to compete with crops in the early grow-
ing season, and therefore negatively affect crop growth. If a cover crop is appropriately
managed, it is most likely to have little or no negative effect on crop yield. In this paper,
I assume no yield benefit or yield loss associated with a cover crop.
3.3.3 Crop Enterprises
Cropland in the Wolf Creek Watershed is all in corn-soybean rotation. In order to
eliminate the effect of different orders of corn-soybean rotation on a change of crop
production and nitrogen runoff, I assume that half of the cropland grows corn and the
other half grows soybean each year. Farm management costs involve seeds, chemicals,
machinery, labor and other miscellaneous expenses. Land rent is not included. The
cost of chemicals, labor and machinery are adjusted properly to reflect different farm
management practices, based on studies of conservation practices in Iowa (Kling et al.,
2007; Iowa State University Extension, 2013; Duffy and Calvert, 2015) and the Iowa
Nutrient Reduction Strategy. Table 3.2 reports the costs of farm management alter-
natives in 2015 USD. Details are available in the appendix. Additionally, by assuming
constant input and output prices over time, I eliminate the effect of price volatility
on farm management decisions. Changes in farm management decisions come from
a balance between crop production and nitrogen runoff. The market price of corn is
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$218.91/metric ton, and the price of soybean is $477.68/metric ton.5 These are Iowa
inflation-adjusted averages for 2011-2015. Moreover, although forest, timber, and grass
can bring about economic values, such values are not counted here because there is
currently no established market for them and price information is not available. In this
regard, the cost estimates for land retirement would be higher than its actual cost.
Table 3.2: Estimated Crop Production Cost in Corn-Soybean Rotation ($/acre)
Management Corn Soybean Management Corn Soybean
Ba 484.33 287.96 Nt 476.66 301.80
Ac 484.33 287.96 RN 463.62 290.83
Rf 471.29 283.16 NC 544.61 367.99
Gw 577.08 381.32 RNC 531.57 363.08
Ct 491.82 298.17 Fd* 295.01 295.01
Cc 552.28 362.99 Pr* 171.00 171.00
RC 539.24 356.50
Note: The costs of forest and prairie costs involve their site preparation, establishment and
management.
3.3.4 Total Nitrogen
Total nitrogen (TN) in the study area includes five components of TN: organic nitrogen,
NO3-N in surface flow, NO3-N in lateral flow, NO3-N in tile flow and NO3-N in ground-
water, displayed in Figure 3.4. The flow of TN is determined by farm management,
weather, and soil conditions. During 2004 to 2013, the annual TN flow in the Wolf
Creek Watershed was 2.3 million kilograms on average, but it ranged from 0.6 million
kilograms to 4.6 million kilograms. Nitrogen in tile flow is an important part of TN,
which receives more attention in the Midwest where tile drainage is extensively applied.
Drainage tiles short-circuit many natural processes through trees, shrubs, and grasses
in the environment, which would slow down water flows and absorb nitrogen. Nitrogen,
5 Since the prices are reported in bushels, Hohanns and Smith (2013) suggest converting them into
prices per metric ton using conversion rates of 39.37 for corn and 36.74 for soybean.
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therefore, moves faster in the tiles to waterways. Nitrogen in the groundwater is in-
fluenced by farm management and could cause health concerns directly. Keeler (2013)
finds that the conversion of grassland to agriculture in southeastern Minnesota from
2007 to 2012 could increase the number of contaminated wells, i.e., the wells exceeding
10 ppm nitrate-nitrogen, by 45%. However, since there is no observation available in
the study area to validate the results, I use the SWAT results on groundwater nitrogen
in this paper.
Figure 3.4: Components of Total Nitrogen Runoff in the Wolf Creek Watershed
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Note: NO3-N in groundwater is negligible in total nitrogen, so it is not included here.
Figure 3.5: Total Nitrogen under Different Farm Management in the Wolf Creek Wa-
tershed
Farm management influences TN by changing crop growth, nutrient use efficiency,
the nitrogen cycle and nitrogen mineralization. Figure 3.5 compares the average TN
from 2004 to 2013 in the Wolf Creek Watershed under different farm management prac-
tices. These averages are the levels of TN that would have flowed into the watershed
annually when one farm management practice was applied to the entire area (except
the land used for transportation). Among these farm management alternatives, land
retirement performs best in reducing TN, as it removes all agricultural activities on
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the land.6 Cover crop also significantly reduces TN, especially NO3-N in tile flow.
Cover crops form a protective canopy to diminish the effect of precipitation on the soil
surface, and store underutilized fertilizer before the next rotation of crop is planted.
Grassed waterways assist in reducing soil erosion and trapping sediment. This practice
effectively reduces organic nitrogen but has little influence on other nitrogen compo-
nents. Conservation tillage and no tillage, if not properly allocated, might generate
higher nitrogen runoff than the baseline.
Figure 3.6: Mean and Standard Deviation of Total Nitrogen at HRU Level
Figure 3.6 shows the relationship between the average and the standard deviation
6 During SWAT simulation, tile drainage is not removed when land is converted to prairie or forest.
That is the reason why NO3-N in tile flow still exists. While this affects the amount of different
components of TN, it makes little change to the overall value of TN.
47
of TN, over the ten-year study period, at the HRU level under the baseline scenario.
On the one hand, when TN is not large, there is a positive correlation between the
average and the standard deviation of TN. In other words, the smaller the runoff, the
smaller the range over which it fluctuates. TN variance is roughly inversely related to
average abatement. On the other hand, when TN is very large, its variance seems to
decrease slightly. Moreover, there is a wide range of standard deviations of TN for any
given level of TN. Decisions on pollution control are not as simple as determining the
level of average reduction. These decisions should take into account a level of standard
deviation of TN, which will be even more complex if one includes the spatial correlation
between different HRUs. In this regard, it is essential to consider carefully the spatial
characteristics, the reduction effect and reliability of an induced reduction for different
farm management alternatives, to generate a reliable reduction in TN.
3.4 Results
Processing the simulation data on the effect of farm-management practices on crop
production and agricultural runoff, and solving the optimization problem of pollution
control using MATLAB with Cplex solver, we can derive the solutions to different
targets on agricultural runoff.7 More details of the optimization models are available
in the appendix. In order to achieve a 41% reduction in agricultural nitrogen runoff,
as specified in the Iowa Nutrient Reduction Strategy, a $1.2 million loss in crop profit
is incurred annually if using only an average target. The marginal cost of abatement is
$15.6/kg. An opportunity for a win-win exists: i.e., to decrease TN without bringing
down the crop profit below the baseline, as long as agricultural expansion is allowed and
a reduction target is below 38%.8 Nevertheless, if using a reliability target with 70%
reliability level to meet a 41% reduction, there will be a $59.8 million loss in crop profit
annually in a robust solution, i.e. 75% of the baseline profit. Compared with Roy’s
7 This paper uses a MATLAB toolbox called XProg to transform the optimization problem here
into a mixed-integer programming that can be solved via Cplex. The MATLAB toolbox is publicly
available on the website http://xprog.weebly.com/.
8 Farmers are not applying their optimal farm-management practices in the baseline scenario based
on the spatial data and farmer surveys available. However, this result might change if there is more
precise data on farm management of each farm in the watershed is available, because we base our
computation on farmer surveys which reflect the general conditions on farm management which do not
consider the heterogeneity among each farm.
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method, the improved robust solution in the paper alleviates the over-conservativeness
problem by increasing $1.1 million in the annual agricultural profit. The marginal cost
of abatement is $46.7/kg. If there is more information on the probability distribution of
pollution, it is likely to be less loss in crop profit. For example, if TN follows a normal
distribution, the loss in annual crop profit is $27.2 million, i.e., 34% of the baseline
profit, to meet the 70% reliability requirement.
3.4.1 Agricultural Profit and Spatial Allocation
Figure 3.7 displays agricultural profits under different reliability targets. In general,
it is more difficult to initiate a reduction at a higher reliability level. The shape of
each agricultural profit curve is roughly concave with respect to a TN reduction level,
implying an increasing marginal cost of abatement. Agricultural profit also declines as
the reliability requirement increases. Agricultural profit curves under different reduction
targets converge when a reliability level is either very high or very low. Additionally, due
to a complicated relationship between TN variance and abatement efforts, enhancing
the reliability level by 1% does not necessarily lead to an increase in the corresponding
marginal cost of abatement. Therefore, the shape of agricultural profit under different
reduction targets is not necessarily concave. For example, under a TN reduction target
of 20%, the marginal cost to achieve an additional unit of reliability is $0.69 million at
a 50% reliability level, and $0.60 million at a 60% reliability.
Figure 3.8 displays the proportions of the areas of cost-effective abatement efforts
under different reduction targets. Cover crops and reduced application rate of fertilizer
are important in reducing TN, no matter whether a reliability requirement is imposed
or not. Particularly if a reduction target is around 60%, these farm management al-
ternatives are dominant in a cost-effective solution, as they effectively reduce TN while
maintaining agricultural production. Under a reliability target with 70% reliability re-
quirement, this group of farm management practices is applied intensively in a robust
solution if a reduction target is not high. In addition, land retirement is effective to
reliably reduce TN. However, land retirement is very costly not only because it takes
time and resources to establish a forest or prairie, but also because it removes all agri-
cultural activities from land. Therefore, Figure 3.8 shows that under an average target,
land retirement is considered only when the reduction goal is very high. While land
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retirement is costly, it is indispensable in achieving a reliable reduction. Moreover, be-
sides cover crops and land retirement, grassed waterways are also important to reduce
TN. This practice is used extensively in a reliable reduction, as it is more effective in
reducing organic nitrogen than most of the other abatement practices.
Figure 3.7: Robust Solutions to Total Nitrogen Reduction in the Wolf Creek
Watershed
Figure 3.9 compares the spatial allocation of the cost-effective solutions under dif-
ferent reduction targets. At the optimal solution, much of the upper-west and the
upper-east areas of the watershed remain in their baseline practices. An opportunity
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for agricultural expansion in this area under a low average target exists. Reduced ap-
plication rate of fertilizer and cover crops are preferred in the south of the watershed.
When the reduction target is higher, on the right of the figure, this group of farm man-
agement alternatives takes a larger area in the south, where grassed waterways were
previously applied. Under a reliability target, land retirement is preferred in the west
of the watershed, and it starts to take a larger area in the south, where the group of
reduced fertilizer and cover crops was applied.
Figure 3.8: Farm Management Area under Different Reduction Targets
Furthermore, Figure 3.10 shows that farmers are not equally affected in nitrogen
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abatement: Some suffer a great loss in agricultural profit, while some may even experi-
ence a profit gain. For example, farmers in the upper-west of the watershed and along
the Wolf Creek River are less affected than those in the central and the southern areas
of the watershed. Particularly, some farmers alongside the Wolf Creek River always
have profit gains in a TN reduction. For this reason, policies such as cost-share pro-
grams, subsidies, education and extension efforts should take into account the distinctive
reduction outcomes of nitrogen runoff on different areas and farmers.
Figure 3.9: Agricultural Profit and Cost-Effective Farm Management
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Figure 3.10: Changes in Agricultural Profit under Different Reduction Targets
The estimates on abatement cost in this paper, i.e. the difference between the base-
line and the cost-effective agricultural profits, are in general compatible with previous
estimates and are within a reasonable range. For example, Doering et al. (1999) es-
timate the range of average abatement cost of nitrogen from non-atmospheric sources,
which is from $48.12/kg to $233.33/kg around Albemarle/Pamlico and Chesapeake Bay.
Ribaudo et al. (2001) provide a lower average cost varying from $0.50/kg to $4.62/kg
in the Mississippi Basin. They include a change in social welfare and environmental
benefit in the cost. The difference between my estimates and the previous estimates
is possibly due to three factors. One is the availability of BMPs. This paper includes
several BMPs, such as cover crops and grassed waterways, which are not considered in
the previous estimates. With broader availability of BMPs, it is reasonable that the
abatement cost here is lower than the previous estimates (as an example, $11.8 million
to achieve the 0.2 million kilograms nutrient reduction, in Harding, 1993). Second is the
elements included in abatement cost. The estimation in this paper focuses on the loss
in agricultural profit and does not involve administrative costs (e.g., Harding, 1993),
or governmental cost and environmental benefits (e.g., Ribaudo et al., 2001). Third
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is spatial heterogeneity. Agricultural cost and revenue are influenced by local climate,
soil, and plant as well as other local factors. While the estimate of abatement cost in,
the Tar-Pamlico Basin in North Carolina or the Chesapeake Bay, for example, provides
a reference, it cannot be taken as the cost in other places. Indeed, the Wolf Creek
Watershed is located in the Midwest of the United States, where cropland is mostly
tile-drained. Because the average abatement cost on tile-drained land is substantially
lower than that on non-drained land (Petrolia and Gowda, 2006), it is reasonable that
the estimates are different from values based on places without tile drainage.
3.4.2 Agricultural Profit and Different Restrictions
It is generally accepted that agricultural profit is reduced more with a smaller array
of farm management alternatives. However, there is a concern of local communities,
agencies or governments about using some practices for the sake of, for example, pro-
tecting the local environment, developing the local economy, or reducing administrative
costs. Therefore, some farm management alternatives might not be available in some
cases. Table 3.3 compares agricultural profits under five scenarios, according to the
availability of farm management alternatives. Under Scenario A all farm management
alternatives are available. It has the highest agricultural profit of all the scenarios. Un-
der Scenario B, agricultural expansion is not allowed. The public might worry that if
non-cropland is converted for agricultural use, the local biome will be disturbed and the
ecosystem services provided by wetlands or forests will be significantly reduced, which
is harmful to the local environment. To this end, agricultural expansion is not allowed,
thus eliminating possible opportunities for profit increase. Under Scenario C there are
no unstructured practices. Unlike a structured practice, an unstructured practice like
reduced application rate of fertilizer does not visibly change the configuration of the
soil surface. There is no cost-effective way to monitor such practice, however. In order
to avoid high monitoring cost and potential misrepresentation, Table 3.3 displays the
cost when a reduced application rate of fertilizer and its combinations are not available.
Compared with Scenario A, agricultural profit does not decrease much in Scenario B
and C. Scenario D does not allow cover crops. As a traditional management option in
agriculture, a cover crop is not used to produce harvestable crop but to fertilize and
protect the soil. Very recently, it has begun to attract attention as a way to control
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agricultural runoff. From Table 3.3, cover crops are apparently important in TN reduc-
tion. Agricultural profit drops significantly when a cover crop is not available, because
cover crops are widely applied in a cost-effective solution to control nitrogen runoff.
Under Scenario E, land retirement is not available. Land retirement is very effective
and also indispensable in achieving a high reduction, as well as a reliable reduction.
Without land retirement, it is impossible to meet a reliability requirement or to achieve
a reduction higher than 55%. However, land retirement is the most costly among all
the farm management alternatives. When there is no reliability requirement, it is not
considered and thus does not affect agricultural profit under a low reduction target.
Table 3.3: Agricultural Profit under Restrictions (% Baseline Profit)
Reduction Reliability A B C D E
Average
Targets
25% 103% 103% 103% 79% 103%
35% 101% 100% 101% 67% 101%
45% 97% 96% 97% 54% 97%
55% 90% 88% 88% 40% 89%
65% 69% 68% 65% 25% n.a.
75% 39% 39% 36% 6% n.a.
85% 4% 4% 2% -15% n.a.
Reliability
Targets,
70%
Robust
25% 58% 58% 56% 40% n.a.
35% 45% 45% 43% 31% n.a.
45% 32% 31% 30% 21% n.a.
55% 18% 17% 16% 9% n.a.
65% 3% 2% 1% -4% n.a.
75% -14% -14% -15% -18% n.a.
85% -37% -37% -37% -37% n.a.
Note: A: All farm management alternatives are available. B: Non-cropland cannot
be converted to cropland. C: No reduced fertilizer or its combinations are allowed.
D: No cover crop or its combinations are allowed. E: Cropland cannot be retired, i.e.
converted into forest or prairie.
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3.5 Considerations on Margin of Safety
A Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) is like a “pollution budget”, which calculates
the maximum of a pollutant that a water body can absorb, and allocates necessary
portions of reduction to different pollution sources. A number of TMDL projects have
been developed to control nutrient pollution, e.g., Lake Thunderbird in Oklahoma,
Minnehaha Creek and Hiawatha in Minnesota, and the Animas River in New Mexico.9
Mathematically, a TMDL equals to the sum of point source loading allocation,
nonpoint source loading allocation and a margin of safety.10 A portion of the
TMDL is reserved for a margin of safety to account for the effect of uncertainty on
pollution control. The pollutant loads that are allocated to point and nonpoint sources
are therefore smaller than the TMDL. Walker (2003) partitions a margin of safety into a
margin of uncertainty, which accounts for prediction error caused by limitations of data
and models, and a margin of variability, which refers to environmental variability that
determines the frequency of meeting a reduction target. Considering the definition and
the purpose of a margin of safety, especially a margin of variability, it is closely related
to the reliability problem of pollution control in this paper.
While Franceschini and Tsai (2008) and Hantush (2009) point out that the values of
margins of safety should take into account the reliability level or probability that a water
quality target is met, margins of safety are not well designed in current TMDL projects
(Dilks and Freedman, 2004). There is no clear rule or guidance on how reliability of
pollution control or uncertainty should be incorporated into the calculation of margins
of safety in existing TMDLs. For example, Zhang and Yu (2004) find that a margin of
safety typically ranges from 5% to 10% of a TMDL load, although sometimes the range
could be 5% to more than 40% (Minnesota Environmental Protection Agency, nd). In
the Midwest (EPA Region 5 and 7), the most common margin of safety is 10% TMDL.
More details are available in the appendix. Almost all margins of safety are subjectively
chosen and are unable to reflect the reliability requirements of reduction targets (Dilks
and Freedman, 2004; Zhang and Yu, 2004).
9 Details of these TMDL projects can be found on the website www.epa.gov/tmdl/impaired-waters-
and-nutrients.
10 A margin of safety can be implicit, which is incorporated into a TMDL analysis via conservative
assumptions. It can also be explicit, which is expressed as a portion of loading in a TMDL. In this
paper, I focus on the explicit margin of safety.
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Table 3.4: Mapping between Margins of Safety and Reliability levels, Robust
TMDL Reliability Level
50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
75% 38% 41% 45% 49% 54%
65% 33% 36% 39% 42% 47%
55% 28% 30% 33% 36% 40%
45% 23% 25% 27% 29% 32%
35% 17% 19% 21% 23% 25%
25% 12% 13% 15% 16% 17%
15% 7% 8% 8% 9% n.a.
Note: TMDL in Column 1 and margins of safety in the right columns are
expressed in % baseline pollutant load. TMDL reflects a reduced pollution
target, and a margin of safety reflects the requirement on reliability of
pollution control. The pollutant loads allocated to point and nonpoint
sources equal to the TMDL, subtracting the margin of safety.
By relating a margin of safety to a reliability target, Table 3.4 displays the improved
margins of safety in the Wolf Creek Watershed. For example, in a TMDL project
which restricts pollution to 55% baseline load with 70% reliability level, Table 3.4 shows
that the margin of safety should be 33%. In other words, pollution from point and
nonpoint sources should not exceed 22% baseline load. The value of the margin of
safety increases with a stricter reliability requirement, as it is more difficult to achieve
a reduction at a higher reliability level. The value also decreases with a lower TMDL,
as the corresponding space for additional abatement is smaller. Compared with a fixed-
value or a fixed-TMDL ratio margin of safety, the improved margin of safety provides
a more precise value to meet a reliability target. The improved margins of safety are
mostly higher than current margins of safety. If there is more specific information on the
probability distribution of pollution, the improved margins of safety could be lowered.
Figure 3.11 shows the difference between agricultural profits of a cost-effective solution
and the improved margin of safety. The spatial allocation of farm-management practices
is different under these two scenarios, but the difference in agricultural profits is small
relative to the baseline agricultural profit. This difference in agricultural profits also
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decreases with a higher reduction target.
Figure 3.11: Agricultural Profit under Cost-Effective Solutions and Improved MOS
3.6 Discussion
The motivation for this paper is to analyze the reliability problem of agricultural runoff
control. As discussed earlier, I consider the impact of farm management practices as
well as their spatial allocation on the probability distribution of agricultural runoff and
improve a robust abatement solution by employing a better balance between pollution
reductions and agricultural profits. Moreover, this paper argues that the margins of
safety in TMDLs currently are not reasonably designed to reflect a reliability level of
a reduction target. The values of margins of safety should be connected with different
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requirements on reliability and reduction.
The frequencies of meeting a reduction target are distinctive under an average target
and under a reliability target. If setting an average target of 41% nitrogen reduction,
there would be five years in 2004-2013 in which we cannot meet the 41% annual reduc-
tion, and the highest gap would be 2.1 million kilograms. If a reliability target with a
requirement of 70% probability is used, there would only be one year in which we miss
the annual reduction, with the gap being 0.3 million kilograms. When environmen-
tal damage is related mostly to peak flows, the actual damage will differ substantially
(Bystrom et al., 2000). However, in most cases, the expected pollution damage is not
clear because either the probability distribution of pollution or the pollution damage is
little known. It is difficult to maximize the expected social welfare as usual. Segerson
(1988) suggests using an average target for pollution, but this target is not satisfactory
when the actual damage is not linear in pollution. Although its precise effect on the
expected social welfare is not clear, a reliability target controls the upper bound of the
expected damage of pollution. The expected social welfare is thus protected by a lower
bound.
Compared with an average target, a reliability target changes the traditional way
of how water quality is managed. It directly caps the probability of failure to meet
a reduction target, and highlights the water quality management which limits the oc-
currence of heavy runoff. As many studies predict under climate change, the higher
temperature in aquatic systems in the future is likely to favor algal bloom, and the
higher frequency of extreme weather events like heavy rainfall might make nutrients
and sediments more easily washed off from the land. Under increasing environmental
uncertainty, it is significant and necessary to consider reliability of pollution control in
water quality management.
A reliability target is costly to achieve nonetheless, since it requires more abatement
effort to prevent the worst runoff events from occurring. While I have not yet discussed
the consequent damages of agricultural runoff or the benefits of runoff reductions in
this paper, it does not mean that they are negligible (compared with abatement costs)
for policymakers to set a reasonable reliability target. Eutrophication of the United
States freshwater, as Dodds et al. (2009) compute, degrades lake-front property ($0.3
billion - $2.8 billion per year) and recreational water usage ($1 billion per year), harms
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the living of threatened and endangered species ($44 million per year), and affects the
quality of drinking water ($813 million per year). More damages also lie in the negative
effect of agricultural runoff on marine ecosystem, flood control, ecosystem services and
public health (e.g. Diaz and Rosenberg, 2008; Martin, 1999). Brink and van Grinsven
(2011) give an estimate of health costs from ecosystem impacts via N-runoff, e5-20/kg
N. Combining the potential damage as well as the benefits, policymakers can make a
reasonable judgment on target setting for agricultural runoff.
Still, the actual costs of reliable reductions would be lower than the estimates in this
paper, if cover crops could be properly managed to achieve yield gains of crops, or if the
market for forest, timber, and grass is well-established so that the economic values of
forests and prairie can be realized. Moreover, there are two important practices which
have not been discussed in the paper: controlled tile drainage and nutrient management,
such as split application. These practices could reduce the nutrient runoff, and more
importantly decrease the variation of nutrient runoff effectively. Farmers may change
the timing and the quantity of fertilizer application and runoff in the tile, depending on
the weather and other environmental changes they observe in the same period. These
practices are most likely to decrease the cost of reliable reductions. In addition, with
more information on the probability distribution of agricultural runoff, the abatement
cost could be reduced further. Future research is needed to understand the relationship
between abatement efforts and the variance of agricultural runoff. Iowa has already
spent $235 million on the Environmental Quality Incentives Program in the period 1997-
2015, $125 million on the Conservation Stewardship Program in 2011-2014, and almost
$4 billion on the Conservation Reserve Program in 1995-2015. However, these might
still be far from achieving a reliable reduction. More education and extension efforts
are also needed, especially in the area which is less negatively affected by abatement.
Chapter 4
Reliability of Pollution Control,
Implementation, and Asymmetric
Information
4.1 Introduction
There is a degree of stochasticity in pollution under environmental uncertainty. The
actual pollution may fluctuate widely in different years. For example, annual nitrogen
runoff, including both nitrite and nitrate, from the Mississippi-Atchafalaya River Basin
varied from 0.5 million to 1.6 million metric tons in the period of 1979-2014 (United
States Geological Survey, 2015). A large literature on pollution control either neglects
environmental uncertainty in the analysis or takes an average target on the pollution
over time, which avoids considering the fluctuation in different periods. Segerson (1988)
suggests using an average target for pollution control, especially when the benefits
of pollution abatement are unknown. However, considering the stochastic nature of
the pollution, an average target fails to consider the fat tail problem of the pollution
probability distribution, where the most serious environmental damage occurs during
extreme pollution events. This type of target embeds two disadvantages in pollution
control: first, it cannot directly regulate the probability of failure to achieve a given
pollution reduction; second, it cannot directly count a decline in the occurrence of
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heavy pollution events as an environmental improvement. Thus, it cannot properly
describe the objective of pollution control under environmental uncertainty, that is, to
improve the probability distribution of the pollution.
In order to better describe the objective of pollution control under environmental
uncertainty, a reliability target and the concept of a reliable pollution reduction are
introduced. A reliability target looks at a pollution reduction and also the probability
that it is achieved under environmental uncertainty. Similarly, a reliable pollution re-
duction refers to a reduction which is not only about the reduction level but also about
the probability that it is achieved under environmental uncertainty. In this sense, the
first-best result of a reliability target for the total pollution in an area should consider
each polluter’s abatement effort and also how these abatement efforts collectively im-
pact on the probability distribution of the total pollution. To figure out this result, the
regulator needs intensive information on polluters’ abatement practices and costs.
However, asymmetric information commonly exists in pollution control in practice.
We may be unable to observe polluters’ behaviors or to obtain the accurate information
on their abatement costs. The unobservability of polluters’ behaviors generates the
moral hazard problem. Take agricultural runoff problem as an example, farmers may
apply more fertilizer than what they report to the regulator. The lack of polluters’
information on abatement costs prevents us from deriving the first-best outcome of a
reliability target for pollution control. We need to address these problems caused by
asymmetric information, so as to realize the first-best outcome of a reliability target.
The unobservable behavior problem can be solved by the instruments which are
based on the consequent pollution. A Pigouvian tax is a typical tool in pollution control,
when emission of each polluter is easily monitored. When it is not, for example, in
nonpoint pollution diffuse sources make accurate metering of emission from each polluter
prohibitively costly (Shortle and Horan, 2002), Segerson (1988) solves this nonpoint
pollution problem by developing a tax/subsidy based on the ambient pollution, i.e. an
ambient tax/subsidy. Although Xepapadeas (1995) attempts to mix a Pigouvian tax
and an ambient tax to gradually transform a nonpoint source into a point source where
individual emissions become easily monitorable, the idea of an ambient tax/subsidy is
widely taken in nonpoint pollution control. Under this scheme, everyone is subject to
an amount of tax or subsidy depending on the deviations of the total pollution from
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a given pollution level. Regardless of the observability of their behaviors, the optimal
decisions of farmers will coincide with the optimal solution to pollution control, when
the ambient tax/subsidy rate is properly determined. Segerson and Wu (2006) and Suter
et al. (2010) further incorporate this ambient tax as a threat in the voluntary approach,
which is triggered by the failure to meet a given pollution level, so as to induce the
first-best outcome of pollution control. Polluters, who are faced with this threat, will
comply with conservation practices accordingly. Xepapadeas (1991) extends Segerson’s
work in a dynamic environment and suggests a combination of fines and subsidies to
induce the optimal result. Hansen (1998) also proposes a damage-based tax on the total
pollution, when the environmental damage function is known. These incentive schemes
all work to solve the moral hazard problem caused by polluters’ unobservable actions
and their undetectable emissions. However, when the environmental damage function
is unknown, which is true in this paper, complete information on polluters’ abatement
costs is indispensable to determine the appropriate tax/subsidy rate so as to attain the
first-best outcome of nonpoint pollution control.
The private information problem can be solved through mechanism design. The work
of Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), and Groves (1973) together creates the Vickery-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) auction mechanism, where every participant has an incentive to reveal
their private information truthfully. Dasgupta et al. (1980) adapt the VCG mechanism
in pollution control and develop an emission tax to minimize the sum of damage and the
total abatement cost. Duggan and Roberts (2002) designs a truth-telling mechanism to
achieve the first-best result of pollution control, where polluters choose the amount of
permits to purchase at a price independent of their actions but they need to report their
neighbor’s emission level. If individual emission or individual use of a common property
resource is detectable, Montero (2008) improves the work of Duggan and Roberts by
incorporating the VCG-payoff structure in permit market, where each participant only
claim his own demand schedule. Polasky et al. (2014) extend the application of the
VCG mechanisms into the optimal provision of ecosystem services, where the benefits
are spatially dependent. These mechanisms all motivate truthful revelation, and attain
the optimal outcome in environmental conservation. However, all these mechanisms
assume that everyone’s behavior, emission or use of a resource is observable.
This paper contributes to the literature by developing an auction mechanism to
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achieve the first-best result of pollution control, where polluters have both private in-
formation and unobservable actions. Inspired by the literature on truth-telling mech-
anisms, we develop an auction where every polluter submits his subsidy bids on how
much he needs to implement each conservation practice respectively and every polluter
will receive a subsidy independent of his bids. A dominant strategy in this auction for
polluters is to bid their actual abatement costs. Considering the moral hazard prob-
lem, polluters may deviate from the conservation practice which he is subsidized to do,
whenever the practice is unobservable. In order to solve this problem, take fertilizer ap-
plication as an example, we first limit the degree of unobservability by subsidizing only
the minimum fertilizer rate that farmers may consider in an area, and then incorporate
a fine/reward based on the total pollution into the auction. This fine/reward will be
imposed on the farmers who are subsidized to minimize their fertilizer application, and
ensures that it is optimal for these farmers not to deviate. This subsidy auction can
obtain the actual information on polluters’ abatement costs, so that the regulator is
able to derive and to motivate polluters to achieve the first-best outcome of a reliability
target for pollution control.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses a reliability target in pollution
control under environmental uncertainty. Section 3 analyzes the unobservable action
problem and the private information problem in the implementation of pollution control.
It introduces a subsidy auction to solve these problems. Section 4 uses the Wolf Creek
Watershed as a study area and examines the implementation of a reliability target under
asymmetric information. Section 5 concludes.
4.2 Reliability Targets
The objective of pollution control under environmental uncertainty is to improve the
probability distribution of pollution. A reliability target is better from this perspective
than a commonly-used average target, because it looks at a decline in the frequency of
heavy pollution, and directly regulates the probability of fulfilling a reduction task of
pollution. The most serious environmental damage occurs during the heavy pollution
events. There are N farmers in the area. Each chooses how to manage its own land
parcel. The regulator creates a list of best management practices (BMPs) of agricultural
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pollution management for farmers. The binary vector xi = (x
1
i , x
2
i , ..., x
K
i ) describes a
farmer’s decision regarding these farm-management options, where xki = 1 means that
farmer i chooses the farm-management alternative indexed k. The binary matrix X =
(x′1,x
′
2, ...,x
′
N ) describes the farm-management practices in the whole area. Define a
target level of pollution as R¯ and a maximum probability of failure as α. Under a
reliability target, the regulator solves Problem (4.1):
max
X
N∑
i=1
E (pii(xi, )) s.t. P(R(X, ) ≥ R¯) ≤ α, (4.1)
where pii is farmer i’s profit, R is total pollution, and  is environmental uncertainty
involving temperature, precipitation and the other stochastic factors. The computation
of farmers’ profits and the total pollution takes account of spatial heterogeneity.
The solution to Problem (4.1) focuses on the effect of different farming practices
not just on the expectation of total pollution but on its probability distribution. For
example, when a farmer applies conservation tillage or builds grassed waterway, he has
the expected losses in profit. Influenced by slopes and soil conditions, these two farm-
management alternatives generate the same expected abatement but different variances
of total pollution. The one with a smaller variance of total pollution is preferred in the
solution to Problem (4.1). If grassed waterway leads to a slightly lower abatement in the
expected total pollution but a much higher reduction in the variance of total pollution,
it may still be preferred in the solution to Problem (4.1). Moreover, this characteristic
of the solution indicates that a single linear emission tax is not sufficient to achieve the
first-best outcome of meeting a reliability target, because it cannot distinguish among
farm-management alternatives which have the same expected abatement cost, the same
expected reduction in total pollution but different variances of total pollution. We may
also find that the marginal expected abatement cost is not necessarily the same across
the area in the solution to Problem (4.1).
The marginal contribution of a farmer to a reliable reduction in the total pollution
is determined not only by the farmer’s action but also by the others’ actions. A reliable
reduction refers to a reduction that keeps the total pollution below some level with
a specific reliability level, i.e. 1 − α in the present paper. Mathematically, it is the
abatement effort a in P
(
R0 −R(x, ) ≥ a) ≥ 1 − α, where R0 is the expectation of
unregulated total pollution. A reliable reduction relates one’s effort to its contribution
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of meeting a reliability target. Moreover, the marginal contribution of a farmer to
a reliable reduction in the total pollution is influenced by the other farmers, because
all farmers collectively change the probability distribution of total pollution. Take
agricultural nutrient runoff as an example. It is likely to be higher in flooding years yet
lower in drought years. If the current array of farm-management practices in the whole
area leads to a larger deviation of nutrient runoff relative to its average level in flooding
years, a farmer’s marginal contribution to a reliable reduction a is more challenging,
because it is more demanding to achieve a in flooding years. If the current farm-
management practice in the whole area generates a smaller deviation of total pollution
in flooding years, the farmer may contribute to a higher reliable reduction.
4.3 Asymmetric Information and Implementation
There are two sources of asymmetric information in achieving a reliability target of pol-
lution control. One comes from unobservable actions of farmers, and the other comes
from private information on farmers’ profits. The classical analysis of pollution control
starts from complete information, which in this paper allows us to directly determine
the proper farm-management practices of all land parcels in the whole area to meet a
reliability target in an efficient way. This proper farm-management practices can be
enforced either by direct regulation or by incentive schemes like subsidies. However, in
practice it is often the case that we have to deal with at least one source of asymmetric
information. If farmers have unobservable actions but their profit information is publicly
known, there are studies on performance-based instruments that make it optimal for
farmers to behave properly to arrive at the optimal level of pollution. In terms of non-
point pollution control, Segerson (1988) proposes a tax based on the ambient pollution
level. Under her scheme, since it is difficult to identify emissions of individual farmers,
every farmer gets a tax punishment when the total pollution is high. This tax scheme
has been later used as a threat to motivate farmers to voluntarily manage their farms
in an efficient way, so as to attain the first-best result of pollution control (Segerson
and Wu, 2006; Suter et al., 2010). Considering the financial strain of Segerson’s tax for
farmers, Xepapadeas (1991) extends Segerson’s mechanism to a combination of penalties
and subsidies. If farmers have private information about their profits but their actions
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are observable, a VCG mechanism can be used to drive truthful revelation of their pri-
vate information. It disconnects one’s bid from one’s payment in the mechanism, and
makes it optimal for participants to disclose their private information. With farmers’
accurate profit information, the regulator can determine the cost-effective way to meet
a reliability target.
While several studies have dealt with either source of asymmetric information, we
need to solve the problem of asymmetric information in terms of meeting a reliability
target when both sources exist simultaneously. This paper contributes importantly to
this question. We will first analyze, when their actions are not completely observable,
how to motivate farmers to appropriately apply BMPs to meet a reliability target in an
efficient way. Next, we will incorporate this analysis into an auction mechanism. This
auction mechanism will be developed to attain the first-best outcome of Problem (4.1)
under asymmetric information, where farmers’ unobservable actions and their private
information on profits both exist.
In the following section, we assume that the regulator prepares an agricultural BMP
handbook which contains a list of BMPs. Farmers have rights to apply BMPs available
in the handbook or not at all. This handbook specifies implementation details and
requirements on all listed conservation practices: for example, the width of the grassed
waterway, and the reduced amount of fertilizer application rate. In terms of reduced
fertilizer application, we assume that the regulator sets the lowest application rate that
farmers will consider in the area as required. It is also the unique unobservable BMP
in the handbook. We will explain the reason for making this assumption in the analysis
below.
4.3.1 Unobservability of Fertilizer Application
Fertilizer application is commonly considered in agricultural pollution control, but it is
hardly observable. Normally, BMPs in agriculture are categorized into two groups. One
is observable such as conservation tillage, cover crop, and grassed waterway, which make
changes on the landscape and can be monitored. The other is unobservable, which is
technically difficult or economically infeasible to detect. Reduced fertilizer application is
a common non-structured BMP. We will focus on the asymmetric information problem
caused by the unobservability problem of this BMP in the present paper.
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Considering the unobservability of fertilizer application, we will discuss two methods
to prompt farmers to use the appropriate amount of fertilizer as described in the BMP.
Suppose that the regulator has figured out the solution X∗ to Problem (4.1), which is a
matrix with the row referring to farmers and the column referring to farm-management
practices. He monitors farmers’ use of the observable BMPs on their land parcels as
indicated by X∗. In order to meet a reliability target efficiently, because the regulator
can observe all the other BMPs, the only question left is whether fertilizer application
is reduced properly in the area. We introduce some notations before analyzing the two
methods. Considering the two categories of BMPs, we convert X∗ into two matrices.
That is,X∗′ = [X∗′A ,X
∗′
B ] whereX
∗
A is a matrix of the farmers whose farm-management
practice is observable, and X∗B corresponds to a matrix of the farmers who need to use
less fertilizer. For farmers in group A, whether they comply with X∗A is directly observ-
able. For farmers in group B, their compliance with the reduced-fertilizer requirement
is unclear. For example, if a farmer has to use less fertilizer and grow a cover crop in an
efficient solution, we can only detect whether he grows a cover crop, but not his fertilizer
application. Farm-management practices in X∗B consist of two parts: one is observable
BMPs, and the other is reduced fertilizer rate which is unobservable. We write the
matrix X∗B = [b
∗
B, r
∗
B], where b
∗
B is group B farmers’ decisions on observable BMPs
with the row referring to farmers and the column referring to BMPs, and r∗B describes
these farmers’ decisions reduced fertilizer rate with the row referring to farmers and the
column referring to fertilizer rate. Given that all farmers implement observable BMPs
properly on their land parcels, to achieve the first-best outcome of Problem (4.1), we
shall make sure rB = r
∗
B.
The first method of inducing rB = r
∗
B requires complete information on farmers’
profits E (pii(xi, )), and it is a tax/subsidy on farmer group B, which is based on
the total pollution in the whole area. The regulator also knows how different farming
practices influence the expected total pollution. For each farmer in group B, we compute
an ambient tax/subsidy rate suggested by Segerson (1988):
ti =
E
(
pi′ri
(
[b∗Bi, r
∗
Bi], 
))
E
(
R′ri(X
∗, )
) .
Since the marginal expected loss in profit is unlikely equal everywhere in an efficient
solution to a reliability target, this tax/subsidy rate may be different among farmers
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and ti > 0. If the total pollution is higher than E(R(X∗, )), farmers in group B will
pay taxes. Otherwise, farmers in group B will receive subsidies. By imposing these
differential tax/subsidy rates on farmers in group B, these farmers will be faced with
Problem (4.2):
max
ri
E
(
pii
(
[b∗Bi, ri], 
)− ti (R(ri)− E(R(X∗, )))) , (4.2)
where R is the total pollution influenced by farmer i’s fertilizer application rate ri.
Assume that E(pi′ri) > 0, E(pi
′′
ri) < 0, E(R
′
ri) > 0, and E(R
′′
ri) ≥ 0. A farmer’s optimal
solution under this tax/subsidy rate is r∗Bi, and the optimal payoff of the farmer in
Problem (4.2) is E
(
pii
(
x∗Bi, 
))
.
The second method is similar to Segerson’s ambient tax/subsidy, but it does not
require information on farmers’ profits. It is a fine/reward on farmers in group B,
which is also based on the total pollution. The regulator knows how different farming
practices influence the probability distribution of total pollution. The method works
as follows: When the total pollution does not exceed R¯, every farmer in group B will
receive a reward g; when the total pollution exceeds R¯, every farmer in group B will
receive a fine q. The relationship between the fine and the reward is g/q = α/(1 − α),
and their values are sufficiently high.1
Farmers in group B are faced with Problem (4.3):
max
ri
E
(
pii
(
[b∗Bi, ri], 
))
+ F (R¯)g − (1− F (R¯))q, (4.3)
where F is the cumulative distribution function of total pollution, which is influenced by
ri. As long as F (R¯) = 1−α is achieved, the expected sum of the fine and the reward is
zero, i.e. F (R¯)g− (1−F (R¯))q = 0. Assume that E(pi′ri) > 0 and F ′ri(R¯) < 0. By setting
sufficiently high g and q, the objective function has a negative first derivative. Because
r∗B in the agricultural BMP handbook is set at the minimum fertilizer application rate
that farmers will consider , farmer i’s optimal solution to Problem (4.3) is r∗Bi, and
the optimal payoff the the farmer in Problem (4.3) is E
(
pii
(
x∗Bi, 
))
.2 If r∗B is not
the minimum fertilizer application rate in the area, farmers may deviate from using
1 Mathematically, g =
α
1− αq ≥ maxi
{
−E
(
pi′ri ([b
∗
Bi, r
∗
Bi], )
)
F ′ri(R¯)
}
.
2 See the proof in Appendix.
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r∗B. They may over reduce their fertilizer application for the purpose of obtaining a
net expected reward by reaching P(R(x, ) ≥ R¯) < α. This does not result in failure of
meeting a reliability target, but it affects whether this target is achieved in an efficient
way.
Depending on whether farmers’ profit information is required or not, the above
discusses two methods that make it optimal for farmers in group B to reduce their
fertilizer application to r∗B. These methods prevent moral hazard of farmers in their
fertilizer application. Particularly, the fine/reward method can be incorporated in a
subsidy auction mechanism which will be discussed next. It ensures that farmers do not
deviate from the requirement on reduced fertilizer application in the BMP if they are
subsidized to do so.
4.3.2 Private Information on Profits
In the presence of private information on farmers’ profits, we need to develop a policy
that prompts farmers to truthfully reveal their profits. Inspired by the auction mecha-
nism of Polasky et al. (2014), we now develop an auction mechanism under asymmetric
information on farmers’ profits and their unobservable fertilizer application. Since “car-
rots” have been historically used in agricultural pollution control in the United States,
we will use a subsidy auction in the following, where farmers submit bids on subsidies
which they need to implement BMPs (Segerson and Wu, 2006). We will prove that this
subsidy auction is a truth-telling mechanism that can attain the first-best outcome of
meeting a reliability target.
We define some notations here. Each farmer has his optimal unregulated practice
x0i , and a number of abatement practices in the agricultural BMP handbook. Farmer
i’s opportunity cost for farm-management practice xki is private information, and it is
cki = E(pii(x0i , )) − E(pii(xki , )). Denote ci = (c0i , c1i , ..., cKi ), where each element in ci
stands for the cost of applying a single BMP like growing a cover crop, or a combination
of BMPs such as growing a cover crop and reducing fertilizer. The regulator attempts to
minimize total cost to achieve an exogenously given reliability target P(R ≤ R¯) ≥ 1−α.
The regulator faces Problem (4.4), which is essentially the same as Problem (4.1):
min
X
N∑
i=1
cixi s.t. P(R(X, ) ≤ R¯) ≥ 1− α. (4.4)
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When information on ci is not publicly known, we introduce a truth-telling auction
in the following. The regulator commits to a subsidy policy which involves a fine/reward
scheme on the farmers who will be subsidized to reduce their fertilizer. Every farmer
submits a series of subsidy bids to cover its cost on different farm-management practices.
The regulator, based on all bids, computes and determines which bids to accept and
which to reject. Assume that E(pi′ri) > 0 and F
′
ri(R¯) < 0 for every farmer i. This
assumption is reasonable because an increase in fertilizer application is likely to increase
a farmer’s profit and also a higher probability of heavy pollution. Also, assume that there
is no cooperation among farmers. Each farmer bids simultaneously and independently.
The details of a subsidy auction are as follows:
Step 1: The regulator provides an agricultural BMP handbook to farmers which entails
the implementation details and requirements on all listed BMPs. Reduced fertil-
izer is the only unobservable BMP, and the required fertilizer application is set
at the minimum fertilizer application rate that farmers will consider in the area.3
The regulator also announces the policy on subsidy payment: At most one bid
from a farmer will be accepted. If a farmer’s bid is accepted and consists only of
observable BMPs, the regulator will directly pay him a subsidy. If a farmer’s bid
is accepted and includes a practice involving reduced fertilizer, the regulator will
pay him a subsidy and also impose a fine/reward on this farmer described as the
second method in Section 3.1. If all of a farmer’s bids are rejected, he will receive
no subsidy.
Step 2: Each farmer simultaneously submits a series of bids si = (s
0
i , s
1
i , ..., s
K
i ), where
each element refers to a bid on an individual BMP or a combination of different
BMPs.
Step 3: The regulator collects all bids. For each farmer i and each of his conservation
farm-management practice xki , the regulator solves the two problems below. The
first problem assumes that farmer i implements xki :
TCk∗∗i = min
X
ski +
∑
j 6=i
sjxj s.t. P(R(X, ) ≤ R¯) ≥ 1− α. (4.5)
3 This condition is used to prove that truth-telling is a dominant strategy in the auction mechanism.
It prevents farmers from underbidding and over-reducing their fertilizer application to pursue a net
expected reward under the fine/reward scheme. However, lack of this condition does not result in
failure to meet a reliability target or achieve a given reliable pollution reduction.
71
The solution to Problem (4.5) is Xk∗∗i = (x
k∗∗
1,i ,x
k∗∗
2,i , ...,x
k∗∗
N,i), where x
k∗∗
i,i has
xk∗∗i,i = 1.
The second problem assumes that farmer i does not make any abatement effort,
i.e. implements his unregulated optimal practice:
TC∗∗-i = min
X
∑
j 6=i
sjxj s.t. P(R(X, ) ≤ R¯) ≥ 1− α. (4.6)
The solution to Problem (4.6) is X∗∗-i = (x
∗∗
1,-i,x
∗∗
2,-i, ...,x
∗∗
N,-i), where x
∗∗
i,-i has∑K
k=1 x
k∗∗
i,-i = 0.
Step 4: The regulator calculates the potential payment pki to farmer i when the farmer
applies xki :
pki = TC
∗∗
-i −
∑
j 6=i
sjx
k∗∗
j,i .
Step 5: If pki < s
k
i ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}, the regulator will reject farmer i. Farmer i
will receive no subsidy and apply the unregulated optimal practice. If ∃k ∈
{1, 2, ...,K} such that pki ≥ ski , the regulator will accept farmer i’s bid k∗ where
k∗ = argmaxk∈{1,2,...,K}(pki − ski ). If there are multiple k∗, the regulator will ran-
domly choose one of them. Farmer i will be subsidized to implement xk
∗
i . When
xk
∗
i is observable, this farmer will receive a payment p
k∗
i . When x
k∗
i is unobserv-
able, he will receive a payment pk
∗
i and will also be subject to a fine/reward based
on the total pollution as described in Section 3.1.
4.3.3 Properties of Subsidy Auctions
The subsidy auction above has a VCG payoff structure, which creates a disconnect
between a farmer’s bid and the subsidy received by this farmer. The value of pi =
(p1i , p
2
i , ..., p
K
i ) is not determined by farmer i’s bids si. A farmer’s bid only determines
whether his bid will be accepted by the regulator or not. Farmers do not know their
contribution to a reliable reduction in the total pollution, which is also influenced by
the other farm-management practices. They do not know the values of TC∗∗i and TC
∗∗
-i ,
either. The regulator collects farmers’ bids to solve the problems in Step 3, and com-
putes the final payment to each farmer. This amount of payment does not depend on a
farmer’s own bid, but on the bids from the other farmers. Farmers do not have incen-
tives to lie about their costs.
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Proposition 1. A dominant strategy for each farmer in this subsidy auction is to
bid si = ci.
Proof: There is no cooperation among farmers. They submit their bids simultane-
ously and have no idea about their effects in an efficient solution to meet a reliability
target. Let’s compute the payoff to each farmer when he submits si = ci and si 6= ci.
We shall prove that si = ci is a dominant strategy for farmers.
When a farmer bids si = ci, there are two possible scenarios. (i) p
k
i < c
k
i ∀k ∈
{1, 2, ...,K}. The regulator rejects farmer i, and this farmer receives no subsidy. The
farmer will apply the unregulated optimal practice, and his payoff will be E(pii(x0i , )).
(ii) ∃k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K} such that pki ≥ cki . The regulator will accept farmer i’s bid
k∗ where k∗ = argmaxk∈{1,2,...,K}(pki − cki ), and farmer i will receive pk
∗
i . Since c
l
i =
E
(
pii
(
x0i , 
))−E (pii (xli, )) and pk∗i −ck∗i ≥ pli−cli ∀l ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}, we have E (pii (xk∗i , ))+
pk
∗
i ≥ E
(
pii
(
x0i , 
))
and E
(
pii
(
xk
∗
i , 
))
+pk
∗
i ≥ E
(
pii
(
xli, 
))
+pli ∀l ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}. When
xk
∗
i is observable, farmer i will have a payoff E
(
pii
(
xk
∗
i , 
))
+ pk
∗
i . When x
k∗
i is unob-
servable, he will face Problem (4.3) under a sufficiently high fine/reward. Since the
minimum fertilizer application rate is the unique unobservable BMP here, E(pi′ri) > 0
and F ′ri(R¯) < 0, the preceding section has showed that the farmer’s optimal decision
is to use the minimum fertilizer as described in the BMP. The payoff of the farmer is
E
(
pii
(
xk
∗
i , 
))
+ pk
∗
i .
When a farmer bids si 6= ci, it means that there exists at least one l ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}
such that sli > c
l
i (overbidding) or s
l
i < c
l
i (underbidding). We discuss each case in the
following.
Case 1: sli > c
l
i. (i) p
k
i < c
k
i ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}. The best payoff of farmer i bidding
sli > c
l
i is E(pii(x0i , )). (ii) pli ≥ cli. Denote k∗ = argmaxk∈{1,2,...,K}(pki − cki ). If l 6= k∗,
the best payoff that farmer i will have is E
(
pii
(
xk
∗
i , 
))
+ pk
∗
i . If l = k
∗, it is possible
that k1 = argmaxk∈{1,2,...,K}(pki − ski ) when sli > cli, and k1 6= k∗. The final payoff that
farmer i will have is E
(
pii
(
xk1i , 
))
+ pk1i ≤ E
(
pii
(
xk
∗
i , 
))
+ pk
∗
i . Thus, the payoff of
bidding sli > c
l
i is no better than that of truthful revelation.
Case 2: sli < c
l
i. (i) p
k
i < c
k
i ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}. If pli < sli, the best payoff of farmer i
bidding sli < c
l
i will be E(pii(x0i , )). If pli ≥ sli, it may be the case that farmer i’s payoff is
E
(
pii
(
xli, 
))
+pli ≤ E
(
pii
(
x0i , 
))
. (ii) pli ≥ cli. Denote k∗ = argmaxk∈{1,2,...,K}(pki − cki ).
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If l = k∗, the best payoff that farmer i will have is E
(
pii
(
xk
∗
i , 
))
+ pk
∗
i . If l 6= k∗, it is
possible that l = argmaxk∈{1,2,...,K}(pki − ski ) when sli < cli. The final payoff that farmer
i will have is E
(
pii
(
xli, 
))
+ pli ≤ E
(
pii
(
xk
∗
i , 
))
+ pk
∗
i . Hence, the payoff of bidding
sli < c
l
i is no better than that of truthful revelation.
We conclude that the strategy si 6= ci is dominated by si = ci. 
This proposition implies that because farmers’ subsidies do not depend on their
bids in the auction, any deviation from truthful revelation may make farmers unable
to obtain their maximum payoffs, which are the payoffs they will get under truthful
revelation for sure.
Besides truthful revelation, this subsidy auction can achieve the cost-effective result
of Problem (4.4). Especially when farmers’ impacts are correlated with each other on
a reliable reduction in the total pollution, different farming practices by a farmer alter
the marginal contribution of the other farmers to achieving a reliability target. Farmers
disclose their actual costs and find it optimal not to deviate from the farm-management
practice that they are subsidized for. The regulator can take advantage of this infor-
mation to determine the cost-effective way to attain a reliability target. In order to
implement the cost-effective farm-management practices, the regulator shall properly
accept and reject farmers’ bids on different farm-management practices.
Proposition 2. This subsidy auction can achieve a reliability target in an efficient
way.
Proof: Proposition 1 shows that truthful revelation is a dominant strategy for farmers
under this subsidy auction. With the accurate information on farmers’ costs, we can
figure out the efficient way to attain a reliability target, and the minimum total cost is:
TC∗ = min
X
N∑
i=1
cixi s.t. P(R(X, ) ≤ R¯) ≥ 1− α.
The corresponding solution is X∗. Obviously, TC∗ ≤ TC∗∗-i and TC∗ ≤ TCk∗∗i ∀k ∈
{1, 2, ...,K}. In order to prove Proposition 2, we need to show that: ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K},
if xki = 1 in X
∗, that is, xk∗i = 1, the regulator will accept farmer i’s bid on xki and
pki ≥ cki ; if xk∗i = 0, the regulator will reject farmer i’s bids, or will accept farmer i’s bid
on another farm-management practice.
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For any xk∗i = 1 where k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}, farmer i should apply xki on his land
parcel in the efficient solution X∗. Hence, X∗ = Xk∗∗i , TC
∗ = TCk∗∗i ≤ TC∗∗-i and
TCk∗∗i ≤ TC l∗∗i ∀l 6= k and l ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}. Under truthful revelation, we have pli−cli =
TC∗∗-i −TC l∗∗i ∀l ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}. In this sense, pki −cki = TC∗∗-i −TCk∗∗i ≥ TC∗∗-i −TC l∗∗i =
pli − cli ∀l ∈ {1, 2, ...,K} and pki − cki = TC∗∗-i − TCk∗∗i ≥ 0. Thus, the regulator accepts
farmer i’s bid on xki and pays him p
k
i ≥ cki . Farmer i will apply xki under this auction.
For any xk∗i = 0 where k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}, farmer i either applies another conservation
farm-management practice or the unregulated optimal practice on its land parcel in
the efficient solution X∗. If farmer i applies the unregulated optimal practice in X∗,
then X∗ = X∗∗-i , TC
∗ = TC∗∗-i < TC
l∗∗
i ∀l ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}. In this sense, pli − cli =
TC∗∗-i − TC l∗∗i < 0 ∀l ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}. Thus, the regulator rejects farmer i’s bids, and
farmer i applies the unregulated optimal practice under this auction. If farmer i applies
another conservation farm-management practices in X∗, then there exists l 6= k and
l ∈ {1, 2, ...,K} such that TC l∗∗i < TCk∗∗i and TC l∗∗i ≥ TC∗∗-i . Since pli − cli = TC∗∗-i −
TC l∗∗i >= TC
∗∗
-i − TCk∗∗i = pki − cki and pli − cli ≥ 0, the regulator will reject farmer
i’s bid on xki , and farmer i will be subsidized to implement another conservation farm-
management practice under this auction.
In all, the efficient way to meet a reliability target is achieved under this auction. 
Figure 4.1 displays the intuition of Proposition 2. Based on the structure of sub-
sidy in the auction, a farmer’s payoff of applying practice l equals TC-i − TC l under
truthful revelation, where TC-i is the minimum total cost of all farmers to meet a given
reliability target, and TC l is the minimum total cost of all farmers to meet the same
reliability target when this farmer applies practice l. According to the regulator’s policy
on farmers’ bids, he essentially accepts the bid which generates the maximum payoff of
a farmer. As long as practice l is in the first-best solution to a given reliability target,
the regulator will accept the bid on this practice because it generates TC l = TC∗, which
is the minimum total cost of meeting the same reliability target.
Although asymmetric information creates difficulty in pollution control, the subsidy
auction above can properly solve the unobservability problem of fertilizer application
and private information problem of farmers’ abatement costs to attain the reliability
target in an efficient way.
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pli − cli
TC l
TC-i
TC-i
45◦
TC∗ Accept
reject
impossible
reject impossible
Figure 4.1: Proposition 2: Efficient Outcome of Pollution Control
4.3.4 Cooperation and Information Rent
Besides the strength of truthful revelation and attainment on the cost-effective result
of a reliability target, the subsidy auction mechanism has two issues embedded, which
Polasky et al. (2014) have also discussed in their study. The first is collusion among
farmers in bidding. When farmers submit their bids independently, the subsidy auctions
are proved to be truthful revealing. However, farmers may collude with each other,
and thus deviate from truthful revelation to raise their total payoffs. Consider an
example of two farmers with one abatement practice available. Each farmer is able
to meet a reliability target on its own by applying its abatement practice. Suppose
their unregulated expected optimal profits are both 10, and their expected profits of the
abatement practice are 5. In a subsidy auction to meet this reliability target, when they
bid 5 truthfully, they will have an equal chance of being accepted. These two farmers
may collaborate in bidding higher, for example, in Table 4.1, for higher payoffs than
truthful revelation.
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Table 4.1: Farmers’ Payoffs in A Subsidy Auction
s2 = 7 s2 = 5
s1 = 7 (1, 1) (0, 2)
s1 = 5 (2, 0) (0, 0)
However, a collusive strategy among farmers may not be easy to sustain. Under
a subsidy auction, farmers who overbid will take a risk of being rejected and losing
the possible gains. Farmers who underbid may receive subsidies too small to cover
their costs. Polasky et al. (2014) point out that this situation is similar to a Prisoner’s
Dilemma where each player has a dominant strategy to defect rather than cooperate,
and to maintain successful cooperation is information-intensive. Particularly when there
are numerous farmers and multiple BMPs available, it is essential to develop a strategy
to prevent deviation from cooperation. To develop this strategy requires prediction of
the regulator’s decision and potential subsidy payment. In this sense, it is important
to know farmers’ private information on costs and also how different farm-management
practice affects the probability distribution of total pollution.
The second issue is information rent, which refers to the difference between subsidies
and abatement costs here. Under a subsidy auction above, a subsidy paid to a farmer
depends on his contribution to a reliable reduction in the total pollution and the bids of
the other farmers. It is at least as large as the farmer’s actual cost. Therefore, the total
subsidy is weakly greater than total cost. The attempt to close the gap between total
subsidy and total cost will result in failure to meet the first-best outcome of Problem
(4.4), because some farmers who could efficiently contribute to a reliable reduction in the
pollution may end up quitting the conservation practices. Polasky et al. (2014) observe
that information rent is an unavoidable feature which motivates farmers to reveal their
private information. Telling truth is a dominant strategy of farmers only if the regulator
commits to its subsidy policy. The regulator cannot later adjust the amount of subsidies
to reduce the information rent, while expect that farmers keep truthful revelation.
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4.4 Empirical Study
In the following, we will focus on the Wolf Creek Watershed in Iowa to analyze reliability
of pollution control under asymmetric information. The Wolf Creek Watershed has a
serious nitrogen runoff problem. It is located in the Middle Ceder Watershed, one of nine
priority 8-digit Hydrological Unit Code watersheds of pollution control identified in the
Iowa Nutrient Reduction Strategy. The Wolf Creek Watershed is 846 km2 (327 square
miles). About 83% of the area is cropland, and annual crop profit was $79.6 million
from 2004 to 2013. The entire watershed is in No. 104 Major Land resource Area,
according to its soil pattern, climate, water resources and land use (Natural Resources
Conservation Service, nd). During the period from 2004 to 2013, an average of 2.3
million kilograms total nitrogen (TN) ran off this watershed annually, fluctuating from
0.6 million to 4.6 million kilograms.
Table 4.2: Abbreviations for Conservation Farm-Management Alternatives
Abbreviation Farm-Management Alternative
Ct Conservation tillage
Nt No tillage
Gw Grassed waterways
Rf Reduced fertilizer (145 kg N/ha, 20.75 kg P/ha)a
Cc Cover crop
Pr Prairie
Fd Forest
RN Reduced fertilizer and No tillage
RC Reduced fertilizer and Cover crop
NC No tillage and Cover crop
RNC Reduced fertilizer, No tillage, and Cover crop
a. Reduced fertilizer refers to the practice where nitrogen application rate is re-
duced by 10%, and phosphorus application rate is reduced by 17%.
This study uses the Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) to simulate the effect of
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different farming practices on crop production and nitrogen runoff. There are 11 farm-
management alternatives to abate the pollution in the analysis, which are listed in Table
4.2. We assume that reduced fertilizer use is the minimum fertilizer rate that farmers will
consider in the area. The implementation costs of different farm-management practices
are obtained from studies on conservation practices in Iowa (Kling et al., 2007; Iowa
State University Extension, 2013; Duffy and Calvert, 2015). The input costs and crop
prices are inflation-adjusted average during 2011-2015 (The United States Department
of Agriculture, 2016; Iowa State University Extension, 2013). We assume no market
uncertainty in the analysis.
Reduced fertilizer application plays a role in the efficient solution to a reliability
target in the whole watershed. There are 7,528 Hydrological Response Units (HRUs) in
the Wolf Creek Watershed. An HRU is the basic unit on which SWAT runs simulations.
It can be regarded as a land parcel with homogenous land use and soil conditions. Table
4.3 lists the number of HRUs that implement farm-management practices involving
reduced fertilizer, i.e. Rf, RN, RC, and RNC, in the efficient solution to different
reliability targets. For example, there are approximately 2,100 HRUs which need to
reduce their fertilizer in order to efficiently meet a 30% reduction in the pollution with
70% reliability level. The use of reduced fertilizer is not trivial to attain a reliable
reduction in a cost-effective way.
Table 4.3: Solving Unobservability of Fertilizer Application to Meet Different Reliability
Targets, 70% Reliability Requirement
Reduction %HRU
Tax/Subsidy Rate ($/kg TN) Fine/Reward ($1000)
Range Mean SD Fine Reward
30% 28% [1.71, 119.2] 37.7 17.7 338 145
35% 27% [1.71, 119.2] 38.6 18.2 344 147
40% 25% [1.71, 128.9] 39.7 18.6 343 147
45% 24% [1.71, 132.4] 41.3 19.3 494 212
50% 23% [1.71, 132.4] 42.5 19.8 529 227
Table 4.3 also describes two methods, tax/subsidy and fine/reward, that are related
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to unobservability of fertilizer application. Continuing the example above, if we know
farmers’ cost information, we can compute the tax/subsidy rates for those 2,100 HRUs.
These taxes/subsidies are based on TN running off the entire watershed. Whether they
are taxes or subsidies depends on whether the total pollution is high or low. These
tax/subsidy rates vary from area to area, since the marginal abatement costs differ
across the watershed. By imposing these differential rates on the 2,100 HRUs, it is
optimal for farmers on those land parcels to properly reduce their fertilizer as in the
BMP. If we do not have farmers’ cost information, we need to use a sufficiently high
fine and reward to motivate proper fertilizer application on these land parcels. Whether
it is a fine or a reward relies on whether a 30% reduction in the pollution relative to
the unregulated total pollution is met or not. By enforcing the fine and the reward on
those 2,100 HRUs at least as high as the values in Table 4.3, farmers on those land
parcels will use less fertilizer, even though their fertilizer application is not observed by
the regulator.
Table 4.4: Subsidy Auction to Meet A Reliability Target: 40% Reduction, 70% Relia-
bility Requirement, One BMP ($1000)
HRU ID X∗ ci TC∗∗i TC
∗∗
-i pi pi − ci Accept
11 Pr 12.1 69,787.7 69,795.1 19.4 7.3 Yes
12 Ac 14.0 69,792.8 69,787.7 0.0 -14.0 No
13 Ac 140.5 69,864.8 69,787.7 0.0 -140.5 No
14 Ac 181.8 69,815.0 69,787.7 0.0 -181.8 No
15 Pr 32.9 69,787.2 69,801.9 47.6 14.7 Yes
16 Pr 53.3 69,787.7 69,801.0 66.6 13.3 Yes
Table 4.4 gives examples of how a subsidy auction works under asymmetric infor-
mation. For simplicity, this table discusses the scenario where farmers have only one
abatement practice: converting cropland into prairie, the full suite of BMPs will be
considered in a moment. We want to achieve a 40% reduction in the pollution with 70%
reliability level efficiently in the subsidy auction. The auctions run on the scale of all
HRUs in the watershed. Every HRU submits a bid on Prairie at the same time. We only
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list the results of HRU ID 11-16 here for parsimony. Take HRU ID 11 as an example.
In the efficient solution to meet the target, this HRU should convert its cropland to
prairie. The minimum total cost of the efficient solution is around $70 million. If this
HRU does not retire the land, the minimum total cost will be higher to meet the target.
The difference between the two costs determines the potential subsidy $19,400 to the
farmer on HRU ID 11. Since farmers disclose their costs in the subsidy auction, the
regulator accepts the bid. The farmer on HRU ID 11 earns a surplus of $7,300, which
is its information rent. Similarly, for the rest of HRUs, the regulator accepts the bids
when TC∗∗i ≤ TC∗∗-i , and rejects them when TC∗∗i > TC∗∗-i .
Figure 4.2: The Subbasins of the Wolf Creek Watershed
Because of computational constraints, for illustrative purpose, we run subsidy auc-
tions at the subbasin level in the watershed rather than at the HRU level to meet
different reliability targets. All 11 farm-management alternatives are considered in the
auctions. Figure 4.2 displays all 28 subbasins in the Wolf Creek Watershed. In these
auctions, every subbasin submits bids on all farm-management alternatives, and applies
the same farm-management practices everywhere within the subbasin. When their bids
on Rf, RC, RN, and RNC are accepted, they expect a fine/reward on them, which
depends on the total pollution. For example, if Subbasin 1’s bid on reduced fertilizer
is accepted in a subsidy auction to meet a 30% reduction in the pollution with 70%
reliability level, each HRU within this subbasin is subject to a fine of $338,000 and a
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reward of $145,000 according to Table 4.3.
Table 4.5 displays the results of subsidy auctions at the subbasin level and the effi-
cient farm-management practices to achieve different reliability targets. In the efficient
solution, Pr and RC are widely used. Land retirement is effective and indispensable in
achieving a reliable reduction in the pollution. More area is converted to prairie with a
more stringent target. The total subsidy paid to farmers is higher than their total cost.
The information rent, i.e. the difference between total subsidy and the total cost, exists
to motivate every subbasin to disclose its actual cost. The information rent seems to
increase slightly with a more stringent reliability target. The size of information rent
is significant, and almost half of the total subsidy is paid for this information rent.
However, there is no way to avoid it, without harming the cost-effectiveness of meeting
a reliability target.
Table 4.5: Subsidy Auction to Meet Different Reliability Targets: 70% Reliability Re-
quirement, Subbasin Level ($Millions)
Reduction X∗ pi∗ TC TP TP-TC
30%
SUB1-11, 13, 16-20, 22: RC; Other:
Pr
29.63 56.52 115.86 59.33
35%
SUB1-8, 10-13, 16-17, 20, 22: RC;
Other: Pr
24.46 61.69 121.63 59.94
40%
SUB1, 3-8, 10-11, 16-17, 19-20, 22:
RC; Other: Pr
19.20 66.95 128.51 61.56
45%
SUB1, 4-6, 8, 10-11, 16-17, 22: RC;
SUB7: Cc; Other: Pr
13.83 72.32 135.49 63.17
50%
SUB1-6, 8, 10-11, 16-17, 20: RC;
SUB7: Cc; Other: Pr
8.47 77.68 143.23 65.55
TC is the total abatement cost of the farmers in the watershed. TP is the total subsidy paid to the farmers
in the watershed.
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4.5 Conclusions
This paper discusses implementation under asymmetric information to achieve reliable
reductions in nonpoint source pollution. Asymmetric information involves farmers’ un-
observable actions like fertilizer application and the private information on their profits.
This paper develops a VCG-payoff subsidy auction that prompts farmers to disclose
their private information, as truthful revelation is a dominant strategy for them. We
also incorporate a fine/reward scheme into the auction. It settles the moral hazard
problem caused by unobservable fertilizer application. By properly setting the values
of the fine and the reward, farmers will opt in and use the proper amount of fertilizer
to attain the reliability target of pollution control in a cost-effective way. This auc-
tion is proved to minimize total abatement cost of meeting a reliability target under
asymmetric information.
There are opportunities for future work on pollution control under asymmetric in-
formation. In the paper, we assume that the reduced fertilizer r∗B in BMP is set at the
minimum fertilizer application rate that farmers will consider in the area. This assump-
tion helps prevent farmers from reducing fertilizer too much under a sufficiently high
fine/reward. While relaxing this assumption does affect meeting a reliability target, it
matters whether a reliability target is achieved in a cost-effective way. If it allows more
flexibility in reduced fertilizer application, other performance-based instrument such as
a tax/subsidy may work better than a fine/reward to motivate the proper use of fertil-
izer, but it is more information intensive. There will be other challenges in research on
designing a proper performance-based instrument to prevent moral hazard, while main-
taining truthful revelation as a dominant strategy for farmers in the auction mechanism.
This performance-based instrument keeps the a VCG payoff structure, which achieves a
disconnect between one’s bid and one’s payment, and makes it optimal for participants
not to deviate from the effective solution to a pollution target.
Moreover, like the other VCG mechanism, this subsidy auction bears the budget-
imbalance problem. Walker (1980) proves that it is impossible for a truthfully-telling
mechanism to be budget-balanced. It is impossible to have budget constraints on bid-
ders or subsidy payments, either (Ausubel and Milgrom, 2004). We also discussed the
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information rent, which is significant and unavoidable in this subsidy auction mecha-
nism, because it prompts truthful disclose of private information. Lewis (1996) reveals
that the optimal mechanism for decreasing information rent typically ask a price of
productive efficiency of pollution control.
Chapter 5
Conclusion and Discussion
This dissertation focuses on issues of water pollution control from point sources and
nonpoint sources. It analyzes the cost-effectiveness of water pollution control and ad-
dresses the objective of pollution control under environmental uncertainty. The three
essays respectively examine permit trading of water pollution, the reliability of pollu-
tion control under environmental uncertainty, and the asymmetric information problem
in pollution control. This dissertation contributes to improved water pollution control
by considering the difference of environmental damage persistence when the environ-
mental damage function is known, where there is a probability distribution of pollution
under environmental uncertainty, and when asymmetric information is a feature of the
problem.
The first essay examines the cost-effectiveness of permit trading among point pol-
luters and incorporates diversity in the degree of environmental damage persistence into
trading ratios. This modification of trading ratios takes account of the difference be-
tween flow pollution and stock pollution, which has been little mentioned in previous
literature on permit trading. It therefore properly solves the non-uniform mixing prob-
lem in water quality trading, and assists achievement of cost-effective pollution control.
With regard to a broader water system, multiple constraints may be imposed on the
environmental damage caused by flow pollution and stock pollution. Proper trading
ratios can also be developed to attain the cost-effective result of this pollution control
problem, but complete information on polluters’ abatement costs becomes necessary.
The second and the third essays address agricultural water pollution control under
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environmental uncertainty. The second essay emphasizes that the objective of pollution
control under environmental uncertainty is to improve the entire probability distribution
of pollution, rather than a pollution level in a specific scenario. Thus, it suggests the
use of a reliability target, which caps the failure probability of meeting a pollution
reduction goal. The empirical study of the Wolf Creek Watershed of Iowa shows that,
by meeting a reliability target with a 41% nitrogen reduction and a 70% reliability
requirement, this reduction goal could be met in nine out of ten years during 2004-2013
under environmental uncertainty. This reduction goal is achieved more consistently
than that under an average target, i.e. five out of ten years.
With advances in biophysical models of soil and water, e.g. SWAT, reasonable
estimations of the effect of different farm-management practices on agricultural water
pollution can be obtained to support the analysis of agricultural water pollution control.
This essay finds that different farm-management practices and their spatial allocation
over the landscape have an impact the probability distribution of total pollution. A
farmer’s marginal contribution towards meeting a reliability target on total pollution
depends not only on their own action but also on others’ actions. Instead of having
an effect on the expectation of total pollution, the effect of different farm-management
practices on the probability distribution of total pollution should be considered so as to
reach a reliability target.
Considering the asymmetric information problem in practice, the reliability of agri-
cultural water pollution control is challenging to attain. The third essay solves the asym-
metric information problem by developing a VCG-payoff auction and a penalty/reward
scheme based on total pollution. In pollution control, especially nonpoint pollution con-
trol, asymmetric information comes from farmers’ unobservable actions like fertilizer ap-
plication, undetectable agricultural runoff from each of their farmland, and their private
information on agricultural profits. By properly enforcing this VCG-payoff subsidy auc-
tion, farmers are prompted to truthfully disclose their private profit information. The
penalty/reward scheme is imposed on the farmers who are subsidized to apply the un-
observable practice, here fertilizer application. Under a proper rate of penalty/reward,
farmers will find it optimal not to deviate from the proper fertilizer rate.
Overall, the results of this dissertation suggest improvement and modification of cur-
rent water pollution control policies. First, a modification of the trading ratio in permit
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trading is necessary, and this will the difference in environmental damage persistence,
so as to attain the cost-effective pollution control outcome. Second, the importance of
the reliability of pollution control as well as the probability distribution of pollution
should be emphasized in pollution control under environmental uncertainty. Although
the current TMDL policy introduces a margin of safety to account for the reliability of
pollution control, the value of this margin of safety is weakly determined, and there is
no clear rule or guidance about how it connects with the reliability of pollution control.
This dissertation reveals the relationship between a margin of safety and a reliability
level of pollution control. It also suggests that in order to achieve a given level of reliabil-
ity in pollution control, a constant margin of safety, which is commonly used currently,
is not suitable. The level of a margin of safety should vary with the level of TMDL. This
dissertation also points out the necessity of further research on the relationship between
abatement practices and the probability distribution of pollution under environmental
uncertainty.
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Appendix A
Chapter 2 Appendices
A.1 Cost-Effectiveness Problem for Stock Pollution Only
In the cost-effectiveness problem of stock pollution only, the Hamiltonian function H,
the first order conditions and the transversality condition of this problem above are
given below, where λ¯ is a Lagrange multiplier constant over time:
H =
n∑
i=1
Ci(ai) + λ¯
(
δS − D¯S
r
)
+ µ
(
−γS +
n∑
i=1
τis
(
e0i − ai
))
,
C
′
i(ai)− µτis = 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} ,
µ˙− rµ = µγ − λ¯δ,
S˙ = −γS +
n∑
i=1
τis
(
e0i − ai
)
,
lim
t→∞ e
−rtS(t)µ(t) = 0.
Solving the differential equations, we have µ = λ¯δ/ (r + γ), which is constant over time.
The size of λ¯ depends on D¯S . The damage constraint on stock pollution is always
binding unless D¯S is not stringent enough.
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A.2 The Kuhn-Tucker Conditions of Problem (D)
Every polluter attempts to minimize its abatement cost and the cost incurred under
permit trading. The Lagrange function of Problem (D) is:
Li = Ci(ai)− pirsi +
∑
j 6=i
pjrji + λi
(e0i − rki)−∑
j 6=i
tjirji
 .
The Kuhn-Tucker Conditions are:
rki : C
′
i(ai)− λi ≥ 0, rki ≥ 0,
(
C
′
i(ai)− λi
)
rki = 0,
rsi : C
′
i(ai)− pi ≥ 0, rsi ≥ 0,
(
C
′
i(ai)− pi
)
rsi = 0,
rji : pj − λitji ≥ 0, rji ≥ 0, (pj − λitji) rji = 0, ∀j 6= i,
λi :
(
e0i − rki
)−∑
j
tjirji ≤ 0, λi ≥ 0,
(e0i − rki)−∑
j
tjirji
λi = 0.
If the constraint λi is not binding, i.e.
(
e0i − rki
) −∑j tjirji < 0, λi will be zero.
However, λi = 0 indicates either pj = 0 or rji = 0 for any j 6= i. No market exists in
this scenario. If the constraint λi is binding, i.e.
(
e0i − rki
) −∑j tjirji = 0, λi could
be positive, C
′
i(ai) − λi = 0, C
′
i(ai) − pi = 0, and pj − λitji = 0 due to non-arbitrage
condition.1
A.3 The Permit Endowment in WQT, Both Flow Pollu-
tion and Stock Pollution
Each polluter in the permit market must meet the requirement that he cannot discharge
more than what is allowed by the permits he possesses. That is,(
e0i − rki
)−∑
j 6=i
tjirji ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
Because rsi + rki = l¯i + ai, the above inequality is rearranged as follows:(
e0i − ai
) ≤ l¯i − rsi +∑
j 6=i
tjirji, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}
1 If C
′
i (ai)−λi = 0 and C
′
i (ai)−pi = 0, then pj −λitji = 0. See the details in Konishi et al. (2015).
102
Multiplying both sides by the river damage coefficient di, aggregating over all polluters
and discounting over time, we obtain the following inequality for environmental damage
of flow pollution:
∫ +∞
0
n∑
i=1
di
(
e0i − ai
)
e−rtdt ≤
∫ +∞
0
n∑
i=1
di
l¯i − rsi +∑
j 6=i
tjirji
 e−rtdt. (A.1)
According to the state equation S˙ = −γS +∑ni=1 τis(e0i − ai), the discounted environ-
mental damage of stock pollution is:∫ +∞
0
δSe−rtdt =
∫ +∞
0
δ
[(
S0 − 1
γ
n∑
i=1
τis
(
e0i − ai
))
e−γt +
1
γ
n∑
i=1
τis
(
e0i − ai
)]
e−rtdt
=
δS0
r + γ
+
δ
r(r + γ)
n∑
i=1
τis
(
e0i − ai
)
≤ δS0
r + γ
+
δ
r(r + γ)
n∑
i=1
τis
l¯i − rsi +∑
j 6=i
tjirji
 .
(A.2)
Combining inequalities (A.1) and (A.2), we have the following inequality describing the
discounted environmental damage of both flow pollution and stock pollution:∫ +∞
0
n∑
i=1
di
(
e0i − ai
)
e−rtdt+
∫ +∞
0
δSe−rtdt
≤
∫ +∞
0
n∑
i=1
di
l¯i − rsi +∑
j 6=i
tjirji
 e−rtdt+ δS0
r + γ
+
δ
r(r + γ)
n∑
i=1
τis
l¯i − rsi +∑
j 6=i
tjirji

=
1
r
n∑
i=1
(
di +
δτis
r + γ
)
l¯i − 1
r
n∑
i=1
(
di +
δτis
r + γ
)rsi −∑
j 6=i
tjirji
+ δS0
r + γ
.
In the equilibrium of permit trading, if permit prices are nonzero, we have rsj =∑
i 6=j rji, ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. Given the cost-effective trading ratio tij = C
′
i(a
∗
i )/C
′
j(a
∗
j ),
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we have:
1
r
n∑
i=1
(
di +
δτis
r + γ
)rsi −∑
j 6=i
tjirji

=
1
r
 n∑
i=1
(
di +
δτis
r + γ
)
rsi −
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
(
di +
δτis
r + γ
)
tjirji

=
1
r
 n∑
j=1
(
dj +
δτjs
r + γ
)
rsj −
n∑
j=1
∑
i 6=j
(
di +
δτis
r + γ
)
tjirji

=
1
r
n∑
j=1
(
dj +
δτjs
r + γ
)rsj −∑
i 6=j
rji

= 0.
Since D¯ is the limit on the discounted total damage, there is
∫ +∞
0
∑n
i=1 di
(
e0i − ai
)
e−rtdt+∫ +∞
0 δSe
−rtdt ≤ D¯. Therefore, to achieve the cost-effective result of pollution control
with a limit D¯, the amount of permits in WQT shall be:
n∑
i=1
(
di +
δ
r + γ
τis
)
l¯i ≤
(
D¯ − δS0
r + γ
)
r.
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A.4 The Cost Difference between No-persistence Market
and All-Inclusive Market
Figure A.1: The Cost Difference between No-persistence Market and All-Inclusive Mar-
ket: δ
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Figure A.2: The Cost Difference between No-persistence Market and All-Inclusive Mar-
ket: r
Figure A.3: The Cost Difference between No-persistence Market and All-Inclusive Mar-
ket: γ
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Figure A.4: The Cost Difference between No-persistence Market and All-Inclusive Mar-
ket: S0
Appendix B
Chapter 3 Appendices
B.1 Two Versions of Chebyshev’s Inequality
Cantelli’s Inequality (The One-sided Chebyshev’s Inequality)
Let y = R(X; ) − µ(X; ), then the mean of y is µy = 0 and the variance of y is
σ2y = σ
2(X; ). For any t ∈ R and δ > 0 such that t+ δσ(X; ) > 0, we have
P (y ≥ δσ(X; )) = P (y + t ≥ t+ δσ(X; ))
= P
(
y + t
t+ δσ(X; )
≥ 1
)
= P
((
y + t
t+ δσ(X; )
)2
≥ 1
)
.
By the Markov inequality:
P
((
y + t
t+ δσ(X; )
)2
≥ 1
)
≤ E
((
y + t
t+ δσ(X; )
)2)
= E
((
y
t+ δσ(X; )
)2)
+
(
t
t+ δσ(X; )
)2
=
σ2(X; ) + t2
(t+ δσ(X; ))2
.
Since t+δσ(X; ) > 0, to minimize the value above we obtain t∗ =
σ(X; )
δ
. Therefore,
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σ2(X; ) + t2
(t+ δσ(X; ))2
≤ 1
1 + δ2
. In this sense,
P
(
R(X; )− µ(X; )
σ(X; )
≥ δ
)
≤ 1
1 + δ2
.
The Semivariance Inequality
According to the definition of semivariance:
σˆ2(X; ) =
∫ µ(X;)+δσˆ(X;)
µ(X;)
(R(X; )− µ(X; ))2 dF (R)
+
∫ +∞
µ(X;)+δσˆ(X;)
(R(X; )− µ(X; ))2 dF (R).
Therefore, ∫ +∞
µ(X;)+δσˆ(X;)
(R(X; )− µ(X; ))2 dF (R) < σˆ2(X; ).
According to the definition of an integral, it has∫ +∞
µ(X;)+δσˆ(X;)
(R(X; )− µ(X; ))2 dF (R) > δ2σˆ2(X; )
∫ +∞
µ(X;)+δσˆ(X;)
dF (R),
and
∫ +∞
µ(X;)+δσˆ(X;)
dF (R) = P
(
R(X; )− µ(X; )
σ(X; )
≥ δ
)
.
We conclude that
P
(
R(X; )− µ(X; )
σˆ(X; )
≥ δ
)
≤ 1
δ2
.
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B.2 Model Setup in the Empirical Application
In the empirical study of the Wolf Creek Watershed, the optimization model used in
the programming is:
max
X
1
10
10∑
t=1
pit (X; ) ,
s.t. P
(
R(X; ) ≥ R¯) ≤ α,
14∑
j=1
xij = 1, ∀i,
xij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i,∀j,
pit(X; ) =
7528∑
i=1
(pyi,t(xi; )− cixi) .
(B.1)
The chance constraint can be converted into the following to derive a robust solution:
min
(
µ(X; ) +
√
1
α
− 1 σ(X; ), µ(X; ) +
√
1
α
σˆ(X; )
)
≤ R¯
where µ(X; ) =
1
10
10∑
t=1
7528∑
i=1
Ri,t(xi; ),
σ2(X; ) =
1
9
10∑
t=1
(
7528∑
i=1
Ri,t(xi; )− µ(X; )
)2
,
σˆ2(X; ) =
1
9
10∑
t=1
1
(
7528∑
i=1
Ri,t(xi; ) > µ(X; )
)(
7528∑
i=1
Ri,t(xi; )− µ(X; )
)2
.
(B.2)
The crop production yi,t and the total nitrogen runoff Ri,t of each farmer in each
year are available in the SWAT results. This problem can be transformed into a mixed-
integer second-order cone programming problem (MISOCP), and solved by the interior
point method and the branch and bound method. The corresponding cost-effective
solution takes into account both environmental uncertainty and spatial heterogeneity.
B.3 Crop Management Schedule
The following displays the crop management schedule for corn-soybean rotation in the
Wolf Creek Watershed, which grows corn in the first year. The schedule for soybean-corn
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rotation just swaps year.1
Year 1
May 1st Spring tillage: field cultivator
May 4th Plant corn
May 5th Fertilizer
Oct 21st Harvest corn
Oct 28th Fall tillage: chisel plow
Year 2
May 12th Spring tillage: field cultivator
May 18th Plant soybean
Oct 7th Harvest soybean
Oct 14th Fall tillage: chisel plow
B.4 Farm Management Alternatives
Status Quo Baseline (Ba): This is based on the 2008 Crop Data Layer. The crop
management has been applied to the cropland.
All Crop (Ac): The crop management has been applied to all HRUs that are not
in the “Transportation-Roads” (Road) class. Where appropriate, model curve number
values have been changed to reflect the transition from: Range to Crop, Forest to Crop,
and Wetlands to Crop. Range to Crop: increase Cn2 by 10%, Forest to Crop: increase
Cn2 by 15%, Wetlands to Crop: increase Cn2 by 15%.
Conservation Tillage (Ct): This is the same as Ac except that Fall tillage op-
erations have been switched from chisel plow to a generic conservation tillage practice.
Model curve numbers have been updated to reflect the change in tillage practice. For
all HRUs except Road class, decrease Cn2 by 4%. Moreover, conservation tillage can
also be called low-tillage but not strip-tillage.
No Tillage (Nt): This is the same as Ct except that the field cultivator has been
replaced with generic no-till mixing in Spring, and generic conservation tillage has been
replaced with generic no-till mixing in Fall. SCS Curve number is decreased to reflect
1 This content is adopted from Brent Dalzell’s notes on SWAT simulation.
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additional crop residue on the soil surface. Cn2 has been decreased by 4% for all HRUs
except for Road class. Biological mixing increased from 0.2 to 0.4 to reflect expected
increase in soil biological activity in the absence of tillage disturbance.
Grassed Waterways (Gw): This is the same as Ac except that grassed waterways
have been implemented for all HRUs except for Road class. Grassed waterway width
has been set to 10m. Other model parameters are based on HRU characteristics (model
default). Mannings roughness coefficient is 0.35 and Specific Conductivity is set to
0.005. In Operations Scheduling, add Operation of Grassed Waterway. In all, the
related parameters are GWATI = 1, GWATN = 0.35, GWATL = 0, GWATW = 10,
GWATD =0, GWATS = 0, GWATSPCON = 0.005.
Reduced Fertilizer (Rf): This is the same as Ac except that the nitrogen appli-
cation rate has been reduced by 10%, i.e., to 145 kg/ha, and phosphorus application
rate has been reduced by 17%, i.e., to 20.75 kg/ha.
Cover Crop (Cc): This is the same as Ac except that rye is grown between
corn and soybeans. When it is corn going into soybean, rye is planted (Oct 29th)
immediately following corn harvest and Fall tillage. It is killed (May 11th) immediately
before soybean Spring tillage. When it is soybean going into corn, Winter Wheat is
planted on October 15th and killed on May 2nd.
Prairie (Pr): All HRUs that are not in the Road class have been switched to
the “Range-Grasses” class. Where appropriate, model curve number values have been
changed to reflect the transition from: Crop to Grass, Forest to Grass, and Wetlands
to Grass. Crop to Prairie: decrease Cn2 by 10%, Forest to Prairie: increase Cn2 by
5%, Wetlands to Prairie: increase Cn2 by 5%. For all HRUs, ESCO is set 0.9. Prairie
scenarios are calibrated for plant phenology and biomass from available datasets and
primary literature. No assumptions are made about specific mixtures of grasses. It
is assumed that grasslands are established with no seeding operations or machinery
involved.
Forest (Fd): All HRUs that are not in the Road class have been switched to the
“Forest-Deciduous” class. Where appropriate, model curve number values have been
changed to reflect the transition from: Crop to Forest and from Range-Grasses to Forest.
Cn2 decreased by 5% relative to values established for the Prairie Scenario.
Reduced Fertilizer and No Tillage (RN): This is the same as Rf except that
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the field cultivator has been replaced with generic no-till mixing in Spring, and Tillage
has been replaced with generic no-till mixing in Fall. SCS Curve number is decreased
to reflect additional crop residue on the soil surface. Cn2 decreased by 8% for all HRUs
except for Urban/Transportation. Biological mixing increased from 0.2 to 0.4 to reflect
expected increase in soil biological activity in the absence of tillage disturbance.
Reduced Fertilizer and Cover Crop (RC): This is the same as Rf except that
cover crop is grown between corn and soybeans. When it is corn going into soybeans,
rye is planted (Oct 29th) immediately following corn Harvest and Fall tillage. The cover
crop is terminated (May 11th) immediately before soybean Spring tillage. When it is
soybean going into corn, rye is planted on October 15th and killed on May 2nd.
No Tillage and Cover Crop (NC): This is the same as Cc except that field
cultivator has been replaced with generic no-till mixing in Spring, and tillage has been
replaced with generic no-till mixing in Fall. The SCS Curve number is decreased to
reflect additional crop residue on the soil surface. Cn2 has been decreased by 8% for
all HRUs except for Road class. Biological mixing increased from 0.2 to 0.4 to reflect
expected increase in soil biological activity in the absence of tillage disturbance.
Reduced Fertilizer, No Tillage and Cover Crop (RNC): This is the same as
RC except that field cultivator has been replaced with generic no-till mixing in Spring,
and Tillage has been replaced with generic no-till mixing in Fall. The SCS Curve
number is decreased to reflect additional crop residue on the soil surface. Cn2 has been
decreased by 8% for all HRUs except for Road class. Biological mixing increased from
0.2 to 0.4 to reflect expected increase in soil biological activity in the absence of tillage
disturbance.
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B.5 Crop Enterprises
Part of BMP cost is included in the preharvest machinery cost of the crop enterprise
for each farm management alternative.
Table B.1: Estimated Preharvest Machinery Cost
Farm Management Corn Following Soybean Soybean Following Corn
Ba, Ac, Rf Field cultivator Field cultivator
Sprayer Sprayer (2x)
Tandem disk Tandem disk
Planter Planter
NH3 applicator Chisel plow
Chisel plow
Ct Field cultivator Tandem Disk
Sprayer Sprayer (2x)
Planter Grain drill
NH3 applicator Conservation tillage
Conservation tillage
Nt, RN Sprayer Sprayer (2x)
Tandem disk Tandem disk
NH3 applicator No-till planter, soybean
No-till planter, corn Pestcide-burn down
Pestcide-burn down Save seedbed preparation
Save seedbed preparation
Cc, RC Field cultivator Field cultivator
Sprayer Sprayer (2x)
Tandem disk Tandem disk
Planter Planter
NH3 applicator Chisel plow
Chisel plow Cover crop
Cover crop
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Table B.2: Estimated Preharvest Machinery Cost (Continued)
Farm Management Corn Following Soybean Soybean Following Corn
Gw Field cultivator Field cultivator
Sprayer Sprayer (2x)
Tandem disk Tandem disk
Planter Planter
NH3 applicator Chisel plow
Chisel plow Grassed waterway
Grassed waterway
NC, RNC Sprayer Sprayer (2x)
Tandem disk Tandem disk
NH3 applicator No-till planter, soybean
No-till planter, corn Pestcide-burn down
Pestcide-burn down Save seedbed preparation
Save seedbed preparation Cover crop
Cover crop
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In the following, I provide the crop enterprise under the status quo baseline in year
2015. The crop enterprises under the other 12 alternatives of farm management are
obtained in a similar way with proper changes in different cost items. The final cost
of each farm management practice is the average production cost of corn and soybean
from 2011 to 2015, adjusted for inflation.
Table B.3: Estimated Crop Production Cost on Corn Following Soybean
Fixed Variable
Preharvest Machinery 22.70 24.00
Seed, Chemical, etc Price per unit Units
Seed 0.00386 25,000 96.50
Nitrogen 0.47 143.64 67.51
Phosphate 0.48 51.04 24.50
Potash 0.41 48.00 19.68
Lime 10.00
Herbicide 35.50
Crop insurance 12.20
Miscellaneous 9.00
Interest 9.96
Harvest Machinery
Combine 19.00 10.90
Grain cart 5.90 3.20
Haul 6.52 6.11
Dry 8.00 30.72
Handle (auger) 2.63 3.51
Labor 33.80
Total per acre 98.55 363.29
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Table B.4: Estimated Crop Production Cost on Soybean Following Corn
Fixed Variable
Preharvest Machinery 20.00 20.60
Seed, Chemical, etc Price per unit Units
Seed 0.39 140 55.00
Phosphate 0.48 51.04 24.50
Potash 0.41 75.00 30.75
Lime 10.00
Herbicide 26.50
Crop insurance 8.90
Miscellaneous 10.00
Interest 6.21
Harvest Machinery
Combine 15.20 8.40
Grain cart 5.90 3.20
Haul 2.04 1.91
Handle (auger) 0.82 1.10
Labor 29.25
Total per acre 73.21 207.07
B.6 The Margins of Safety in EPA Region 5 and 7
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Appendix C
Chapter 3 Appendices
C.1 Proof: r∗Bi is the optimal solution in Problem (4.3)
Denote the objective function of Problem (4.3) as L. Given that E(pi′ri) > 0, F
′
ri(R¯) < 0
and sufficiently high g and q, its first derivative is:
∂L
∂ri
=
∂E
(
pii
(
(b∗Bi, ri), 
))
∂ri
+
∂F (R¯)
∂ri
(g + q) ≤ 0.
Since r∗B is the lowest fertilizer application rate of farmers, there is L(r
∗
Bi) ≥ L(ri). The
optimal solution of farmers to Problem (4.3) is r∗Bi, and the optimal objective value is
E
(
pii
(
x∗Bi, 
))
.
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